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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The desirability of the free trade in goods and
services is one of the few unchallenged laws of economics.1*
The opportunity to trade without the distortions of various
types of barriers, whether discriminatory subsidies, direct
or indirect tariffs, or total denial of certain goods from a
market, is a panacea which, to the disappointment of
economists, will escape the current world trading system.
But the unreachable goal to which the economists would
strive is an uninhibited market place.

Unfortunately, much

of the history of world trade has been one of protectionism
for domestic industries to the detriment of the desire to
reap the benefits of an open world market.
The early economic history of the United States
followed this protectionist path, and was impacted by the
protectionist policies of trading partners.

Before the

Declaration of Independence in 1776, the colonies were given
favored trading status with the government of Great
. . 9
, ,
,
Britain. Great Britain granted this status to all of the
1Paul Krugman, "Rethinking International Trade,"
Business Economics. 12 (April 1988) .

1

2
nations within her commonwealth; the economic development of
the commonwealth was of the utmost importance to the Crown.
But when the colonies declared their independence from
Britain, the favored trading status previously received by
the colonies was revoked.

Revoking this special trading

status caused great hardships within a young United States.
A mechanism to allow for a more civilized trading system was
needed even in the 1770s.

The world strived for what

Freiden and Lake.called a hegemonic leader; a country
(
willing to take the lead for the liberalization of world
trade.*
4
In the more recent history of the global trading
relationship, i.e. since the mid 1800's, Britain, with its
large commonwealth, assumed the role as the true hegemonic
leader in the third quarter of the nineteenth century; its
leadership would last until the 1880's.^

No other country

in the world could affect the global trading system as
Britain did in the mid to late 1800's.

Britain was willing

to sacrifice some of its own wealth in order that it may
free up the trading relationship that existed in that time;
^Jaboc Reimer. The Economic History of the U.sT
Constitution. (New York: St. Martins, 1989).
Although the Crown protected the colonies from tariffs
its intentions weren't solely for philanthropic reasons; the
Crown stood to gain from the generation of tax incomes from
all colonies as they prospered.
4David A. Lake and Jeffry A. Frieden, International
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth.
(New York: St. Martins, 1987).
5Ibid.

3
the result would be a short-term loss of wealth for a longterm gain m

wealth.

While Britain played the role of

hegemonic leader, the United States could pursue
protectionist policies for its own trade and pursue
expansionist export policies abroad.*
7
*

During the late

1800's Britain came to see that it could no longer afford to
utilize its own resources to accomplish this goal.
Britain's economy was based on primary industry and its rich
natural resource base. At first the industrial revolution
(
was a blessing for Great Britain, but eventually put Britain
at a disadvantage because of its failure to reevaluate its
economic policies after the industrial revolution.

Britain

lagged behind other countries in post industrial revolution
modernization.

The torch of hegemonic leadership had to be

passed to another country willing to commit resources
necessary to free world trade. That country was the United
States.
The torch of hegemonic leader was not passed outright,
as the United States didn't go out and immediately
liberalize world trade.

The United States took several

It appeared that Great Britain was willing to allow
free trade in manufactured goods in an effort to slow
industrial development in other European countries. Britain
felt that it could gain in the long run by freeing trade
because its manufacturing sector was much more productive
and advanced than other European countries. For further
discussion of Britain and free trade see David Lake and
Jeffry A. Freiden, International Political Economy:
Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. (New York: St.
Martins, 1987).
7Ibid.

4
•
•
years to complete its
metamorphis
from follower to leader. ft

The United States didn't assume the role of a true hegemonic
leader until after World War II.

In leading world trade

liberalization, the United States was willing to permit an
open market for the goods of many countries, and in many
cases, the closing of those countries markets for American
goods, in exchange for the economic and political stability
of those countries.8
9

The rise of the United States as a

hegemonic leader could also be seen in the abundance of free
i
trade negotiations with Canada, as will be discussed further
in the next section of this chapter.

Unfortunately, the

United States found that it could not act alone to
successfully liberalize world trade because other countries
were willing to reap the benefits of greater trade
opportunities in the United States, but were unwilling to
open their markets for fear of damage to current production
patterns.10
A new impetus for a more liberalized world trading
system didn't occur until after World War II.

One of the

major goals of the system was not only to remove much of the
barriers to world trade that had plagued its history, but
implicitly appeared to be an attempt to strengthen world
8Ibid.
9
•
• example of this phenomenom is the
^Ibid.
The classic
acceptance of Japanese imports in the U.S. marketplace
without a reciprocal arrangement in the Japanese market for
American goods.
iUDavid Lake and Jeffry A. Fneden, International
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Wealth and Power.
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democracy.

In 1947 the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (GATT) was signed by twenty-three countries to work
toward these goals.

The member nations of GATT have

recognized the need to ensure that the world market system
will benefit all of its members.

The GATT has succeeded in

achieving a less restrictive world trading system, but after
the first ten years of the GATT, it was evident that the
fight to liberalize world trade would be very difficult.
The trading relationship among the members of GATT was
(
becoming more confrontational. The idea of free trade among
most western nations was no longer viewed as a reachable
goal; free trade became recognized as a goal not for the
world, but among regions.
In 1958 many of the western European nations
entertained the idea of creating a regional free trade area
for the production of steel; the motive for such an
agreement was the more efficient production of steel and
with it lower prices to domestic consumers.

It is from this

1958 pact that the European Economic Community (EEC)11 was
born.

The EEC has continued in its development since the

steel production pact and will achieve its goal of full
economic integration of member nations by the 1992.
The relative success of the EEC has created interest by
other nations in creating similar arrangements with trading
neighbors.

Besides the 1960 European Free Trade Area, four

•
The EEC is
sometimes referred to as the European
Common Market.
11

6
agreements are particularly relevant: the 1965 United
Kingdom-Ireland Free Trade Agreement; the 1983 Australia-New
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement; and the 1985
United States-Israel Agreement.

Although all of these

agreements pursue closer economic ties for parties to each
agreement, none has ramifications for creating a broader
free trade arrangement than the United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement.

Although closer economic ties between the

United States and Canada was one reason for pursuing a free
trade agreement, the United States implicitly had a second
very important reason, stopping an export subsidy war with
the EEC.
It appears that the United States hopes creating its
own free trade area will force the EEC to go back to the
bargaining table in the current round of the GATT talks to
settle the current agricultural subsidy dispute between the
EEC and the United States.12

With the agreement over a

United States-Canada free trade area, the American's believe
that they will hold the trump card in this subsidy dispute.
Thus far, the EEC has offered little reaction to the
American-Canadian pact.

IP In order to compete with
•
,
the more efficient
production of the United States, the EEC has provided its
producers with heavy production subsidies so that EEC
producers can compete for lucrative world grain markets.
Without the subsidies, the EEC producers would effectively
be priced out of the market, and the consequence in the EEC
would be significant loss of agricultural jobs.

7
On January 1, 1989 the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) began its implementation process.13

This

agreement has been described as the most comprehensive trade
agreement ever undertaken because it provides liberalization
in all sectors of trade.14

But with a wide-sweeping

agreement with the potential to affect the economic well
being of both nations comes the anxiety of change.

Although

the desirability of free trade has been argued by many
economists from its father, Adam Smith, to the present
(
advocates of this agreement, convincing the public of its
desirability has been the most difficult task of gaining
acceptance of the FTA.
Within the United States there was little debate on the
desirability of the FTA; there was very little mention of
the FTA in the media.

Allowing a relatively small world

trader virtually unimpeded access to the American market
didn't scare the U.S. Congress.

But some of the most vocal

American opponents of the FTA came from North Dakota: the
Governor of North Dakota, George Sinner; and North Dakota's
leaders in Washington, Senators Quentin Burdick and Kent
Conrad, and Representative Byron Dorgan.

Each of these

leaders has expressed reservations over the agreement
because of the fear that North Dakota's two economic
13The FTA calls for a tariff reduction schedule
depending on the readiness of the industry to compete. A
further discussion of the tariff reduction schedule occurs
in chapter three.
14External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement [Ottawa, Ont.]: External Affairs Canada, 1988.
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mainstays, agriculture and energy, will experience decline
due to the provisions of this agreement.

In contrast to the

lack of debate in the United States, Canada has experienced
a more thorough debate on the desirability of free trade.
In Canada, the debate over the desirability of free
trade with the Americans produced deep cleavages.

The

debate was passionate over closer economic ties with the
United States and its potential effect over Canadian
sovereignty.

An~ election was eventually called in Canada

during the FTA's ratification period in which the central
issue became the desirability of free trade with the United
States.

The outcome of the election paved the way for

implementation of the FTA.

The effects of the agreement

can't be fully known at this time; nevertheless, the purpose
of this independent study is to examine the FTA's potential
impacts on the energy sector of the North Dakota economy.
The remainder of this chapter will examine the impacts
that the energy sector has had on the development of North
Dakota's economy and the impacts a movement of decline or
growth in energy production under the FTA would have on the
state's economy.

Chapter two examines past attempts at free

trade between the United States and Canada, and provides a
synopsis of the provisions of the FTA; a breakdown of trade
between North Dakota and Canada is included.

Chapter three

examines the pure theory of free trade, its desirability,
and presents a literature review of the expected impacts of
the FTA for each country as a whole.

Chapter four provides

9
an analysis of the specific impacts that the FTA will have
on North Dakota's energy sector.

Chapter five provides a

conclusion and recommendations for the State of North Dakota
regarding the FTA, based solely on its energy provisions.
North Dakota's Economy
Stradley examined the economic history of North Dakota
using the staple hypothesis of Melville Watkins and found
that North Dakota's economic development has been largely
the result of its two staple sectors: agriculture and
energy.

*1 C

,

,

,

,

The basic assumption of the staple hypothesis is

that a staple export is the leading sector of an economy;
the pace of economic development is regulated by the
staple.*
161
8
7
Stradley argues that economic development in North
Dakota was the result of its agriculture and energy
resources.

The development of staple industries in turn

fueled the development of other sectors of the economy, or
•

•

•

,

in the case of decline in a staple, cause economic havoc.
Stradley called this process of incidental economic
*1 R

,

Scot A. Stradley, A Staple Perspective on Economic
Development in North Dakota. (University of North Dakota:
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, May 1981). See
also Melville H. Watkins, "A Staple Theory of Economic
Growth," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political
Science. 29 (May 1963).
16Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada quoted in
Scot A. Stradley's A Staple Perspective on Economic
Development in North Dakota.
17Stradley, A Staple Perspective
18Ibid.

1O
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development "spread effects."19

Watkin's staple hypothesis

described economic development occurring from a staple
industry by means of linkages; forward linkages, backward
linkages, and final demand linkages.20
Forward linkages are industries that utilize the output
of the staple industry.

An example of a forward linkage

would be a manufacturing plant that chooses to settle in the
state because of an abundance of energy.

Backward linkages

are industries that facilitate production of the staple
export.

An example of a backward linkage would be a

construction company that must build a facility to generate
electricity in the case of thermal-electric generation.

A

final demand linkage would consist of economic activities
designed to provide goods for people working in, and related
to, the staple industry, such as government or a grocery
store.21

Stradley demonstrated that the agricultural staple

played a great part in developing North Dakota's early
economy. The development of the staple energy sector
occurred much later in the state's history than its
agricultural sector, but as a staple energy certainly wasn't
insignificant in the state's most recent history.

19Ibid.
20 Melville H. Watkins "A Staple Theory of Economic
Growth," in Stradley's "A Staple Perspective of Economic
Development in North Dakota.
21Melville H. Watkins "A Staple Theory of Economic
Growth," in Stradley's "A Staple Perspective of Economic
Development in North Dakota.
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North Dakota's two chief economic bases would have the
potential to make the state a relatively powerful nation in
itself, given that the demand and price for commodities
associated with these two sectors remained strong at all
times.

But such an economy, relying on raw materials and

natural resources without a developed manufacturing sector,
has the distinction of being guided by boom and bust cycles.
Such an economy, with manufacturing virtually non-existant,
is dependent on the success of other sectors of the economy,
both domestically and, in the case of North Dakota,
internationally.
In its one hundred year history, North Dakota's economy
has been at the mercy of production factors outside of the
control of the United States, let alone its own producers.
Some of these factors had positive effects on North Dakota's
economy; some had negative effects.

Agricultural subsidies

worldwide have directly affected this state's producers.
Farmers in the state have suffered as result of the low
prices paid for the commodities its farmers produce, causing
many farmers to give up on farming, whether voluntarily
(seeking other employment) or involuntarily (credit
foreclosures).
North Dakota's petroleum producers have been at the
mercy of the controlling cartel of the production of crude
oil, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC).

The State's producers are powerless to affect the

price paid per barrel of its own crude.

In 1973, OPEC's oil

12
embargo on the United States produced a positive effect on
North Dakota's petroleum industry as prices soared and
production rose sharply to meet domestic demand.

The result

was an increase in employment in both the petroleum industry
itself as well as other sectors as a result of spread
effects.

Unfortunately for North Dakota, OPEC's decisions

or failures to agree have also had a negative effect on the
state's petroleum industry.

A lack of consensus on

production quotas among OPEC members increased OPEC
production sharply in the mid 1980's; the world price of
crude dropped sharply as a result.

The result of this

dissensus in North Dakota was a sharp drop in petroleum
exploration activities, less money in the economies of the
affected regions, and fewer dollars collected by the state
in energy taxes.
Overview of Raw Energy Development
in North Dakota
Coal.

The coal industry in North Dakota was the

earliest energy subsector; its development occurred much
earlier than the state's current energy mainstay, the
petroleum industry.

Lignite coal, a low BTU, low sulfur

coal that is in abundance in North Dakota is the sector's
mainstay. North Dakota's coal reserves are extensive and can
be mined cheaply because of its proximity to the surface.
Strip mining has been the most economic way to mine the
state's reserves.

Lignite is a low grade coal that is not

in high demand outside of the immediate producing region.

13
The state's coal in industrial development occurred early in
the state's history because coal was the main fuel for
heating at the turn of the century; coal fueled heating
boilers.22
The significance of the state's coal industry relative
to other energy subsectors began to decline in the 1950s
both in its share of employees and its value as a percentage
of the North Dakota mining industry.23

The most extensive

use of lignite currently became the thermal electricity
generating industry.

Although the state's coal industry

declined relative to other energy industries, coal
production experienced somewhat of a resurgence in the 1970s
due to the low price of lignite coal.24

The coal industry

remains strong in the 1980's as well.
Petroleum and Natural Gas Production.

Petroleum and

natural gas extraction as an industry didn't come into the
forefront as a major contributor to the state's energy
industry until the discovery of major oil reserves in 1951.
The peak of North Dakota production since 1951 has been in
the early 1980s when the value of crude oil was at its
highest historical point.

Petroleum extraction industries

in this state have been very responsive to the price of

22Scot A. Stradley, The Mineral Industry of North
Dakota and its Role in the North Dakota Economy. (University
of North Dakota: Bureau of Business and Economic Affairs,
October 1979).
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
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crude oil as determinant of production.

This responsiveness

of price to production will be further developed in the
fourth chapter, but the implications of this responsiveness
is the potential for boom and bust cycles based on world
price fluctuations.
Natural gas production is closely tied with the
petroleum production, although this isn't true in all
natural gas production.

Dry natural gas, gas with no

accompanying liquids, was produced to a very limited extent
before the 1950s.25

Wet natural gas, gas found in oil

producing wells, started the North Dakota natural gas
industry in the 1950s, augmenting petroleum extraction
development.

Increases in the production of natural gas

closely followed the increase in petroleum production in the
1960s, and again followed increased petroleum production in
the 1970s and early 1980s.
Energy's Economic Impact
State-wide Inpact.

North Dakota's energy sector

accounts for a relatively small proportion of the total
value of economic activity in this state.

Mining, of which

ninety-five percent of this activity come from the energy
subsectors to be examined in this study,26 accounted for
only $697 million of North Dakota's gross state product or

25Ibid
26Energy industries include coal mining; thermal
electric generation; petroleum and natural gas exploration,
extraction and refining.
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about 5.5 percent.

Gross State Product (GSP) is the value

of goods and services produced in the state over a period of
time. For the purposes of this study,

GSP is not very

indicative of energy's impact on the state because its broad
categories do not separate the subsectors of energy
.

,

,

production beyond "mining.

II0 7

,

,

,

,

,

Thus its inability to isolate

the state's energy sector is diminished.

Gross state

product for North Dakota is included in the appendix.

A

measure more indicative of energy's importance in North
Dakota's economy is brought forth by Randall Coon, et al. ? ft
•

Coon measured aggregate economic activity in North
Dakota by an input-output model; a different method than the
gross state product measurement.

Coon measured the value of

economic activity of a number of sectors as a percentage of
aggregate economic activity in the state by the value of
final demand for North Dakota products.

Table 1.1 presents

economic activity in North Dakota by sector.

Coon's

statistics indicate that North Dakota's energy industries
accounted for 15.9 percent of North Dakota economic activity
in 1984.

These statistics demonstrate North Dakota's

07

. . . .
Gross state product shows economic activity m the
mining sector which includes the raw energy sectors of the
state; the utilities section includes electricity
generation. The problem with these statistics is that the
statistics cannot be broken down in any more detail to
effect a more detailed impact of energy in North Dakota's
economy.
28Randal Coon, F. Larry Leidtritz, and Thor A.
Hertsgaard, Composition of North Dakota's Economic Base: a
Regional Analysis (North Dakota State University:North
Dakota Agricultural Extension Station: March 1986).
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greater dependence on its energy industries than the measure
of gross state product where mining accounts for eleven
percent of the state's economic activity.

But energy as a

major sector of the North Dakota economy does not appear to
be as significant as Stradley's description of energy as a
staple.

However the regional impacts of energy development

in North Dakota are very much pronounced.
Regional Economic Impact.

Although the North Dakota

energy sector contributed 15.9 percent to North Dakota's
(
economy in 1984, the direct impact of energy is
regionalized; the western counties of this state are most
impacted.

A map of the North Dakota's eight planning

districts used in the following discussion is included in
the appendix.
North Dakota's planning region one, consisting of
McKenzie, Williams, and Divide Counties, relies more on
energy activities than any other region in the state.

More

than seventy-two percent of the aggregate economic activity
in this region was engaged in petroleum extraction,
exploration, and refining.

The economic activity of North

Dakota Region one is presented in table 1.2

Three other

regions with significant energy sector activity are
included in the appendix to illustrate western North
Dakota's dependence on its energy resources.

Tables 1.2

through 1.5 present the economic activity by sector in the
regions directly impacted by energy production.
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Table 1.1

Economic Activity by Sector as a Percentage of
Aggregate Economic Activity in North Dakota,
1958-1962 Average Compared with 1984.
Increase
(Decrease)
between
1958-62 and 1984

1958-62
Average

1984

Agricultural Crops

41.7

32.7

(9.0)

Agricultural Livestock

21.0

9.1

(11.9)

Agricultural Processing
and Misc. Manuf.

6.5

7.9

1.4

Construction

2.4

1.6

(0.8)

Coal Mining

0.1

1.3

1.2

23.2

29.5

6.3

Petroleum Exploration/
Extraction

1.5

10.0

8.5

Petroleum Refining

1.3

1.5

0.2

Retail Trade and Bus.
and Prof. Services

2.3

3.3

1.0

Thermal Electric
Generation

0.0

3.1

3.1

Economic Sector

Households

Total

100.0

100.0

Source: Randall Coon, F. Larry Leidtritz, and Thor A.
Hertsqaard. Composition of North Dakota's Economic Base: A
Regional Analvsis. (North Dakota State University: North
Dakota Agricultural Extension Service, March 1986)
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Table 1.2

Economic Activity by Sector as a percentage of
Aggregate Economic Activity in North Dakota
Region la , 1958-1962 Average Compared With 1984.

Economic Sector

1958-62
Average

1984

Increase
(Decrease)
Between
1958-62 and 1984

Agricultural Crops

26.0

6.3

(19.7)

Agricultural Livestk

14.0

3.5

(10.5)

Ag Processing and
Misc Manufacturing

3.6

2.0

(1.6)

Construction, Retail
Trade, Bus and Pers
Services, Coal Extr .

3.5

1.9

(1.6)

Households

10.7

13.7

3.0

Petroleum Explor/
Extract.

35.3

69.1

33.8

Petroleum Refining

6.9

3.5

100.0

100.0

Totals

(3.4)

a. Consists of Mckenzie, Williams and Divide Counties.
Source: Randall Coon, F. Larry Leidtritz, and Thor A.
Hertsgaard, Composition of North Dakota's Economic Base: A
Regional Analysis (North Dakota State University: North
Dakota Agricultural Extension Station, March 1986)
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Table 1.3

Economic Activity by Sector as a Percentage of
Aggregate Economic Activity in North Dakota
Region 2a , 1958-1962 Average Compared with 1984.

Economic Sector

1958-62
Average

1984

Increase
(Decrease)
between
1958-62 and 1984

Agricultural Crops

35.2

24.3

(10.9)

Agricultural Livestk

15.1

6.5

(8.6)

Ag Processing and
Misc Manufacturing

5.8

7.7

1.9

Construction

2.0

1.7

(0.3)

Households

28.7

39.8

11.1

Petroleum Explor/
Extraction

10.8

16.6

5.8

2.4

3.4

1.0

100.0

100.0

Retail Trade,
Personal and Bus.
Services
Total

a. Consists of Burke, Mountrail, Renville, Bottineau, Ward,
McHenry, and Pierce Counties.
Source: Randall Coon, F. Larry Leidtritz, and Thor A.
Hertsgaard, Composition of North Dakota's Economic Base: A
Regional Analysis. (North Dakota State University: North
Dakota Agricultural Extension Service, March 1986)
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Table 1.4

Economic Activity by Sector as a Percentage of
Aggregate Economic Activity in North Dakota
Region 7a, 1958-1962 Average Compared with 1984.

Economic Sector

1958-62
Average

1984

Increase
(Decrease)
Between
1958-62 and 1984

Agricutural Crops

22.3

12.9

(9.4)

Agricultural Livestk

28.0

12.5

(15.5)

Ag Processing and
Misc Manufacturing

6.3

5.6

(0.7)

Coal Mining

0.4

4.6

4.2

Construction

2.5

2.0

(0.5)

Households

17.2

25.3

8.1

Petroleum Refining

21.2

20.8

(0.4)

Retail Trade, Pers.
Business Services

2.1

2.4

0.3

Thermal Electric
Generation

0.0

13.9

13.9

Totals

100.0

100.0

a. Consists of McLean, Sheridan, Mercer, Oliver, Kidder,
Burleigh, Morton, Grant, Emmons, and Sioux Counties.
Source: Randall Coon, F. Larry Leidtritz, and Thor A.
Hertsgaard, Composition of North Dakota's Economy: A
Regional Analysis. (North Dakota State University: North
Dakota Agricultural Extension Service, March 1986)
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Table 1.5

Economic Activity by Sector as a Percentage of
Aggregate Economic Activity in North Dakota
Region 8a , 1958-1962 Average Compared with 1984.
Increase
(Decrease)
Between
1958-62 and 1984

1958-62
Average

1984

Agricultural Crops

41.2

13.4

(27.8)

Agricultural Livestk

36.0

9.8

(26.2)

Ag Processing and
Misc Manufacturing

4.5

3.4

(1.1)

Coal Mining

0.5

1.9

1.4

Construction

1.9

0.5

(1.4)

11.1

8.9

(2.2)

Petroleum Explor/
Extraction

2.4

60.5

Retail Trade, Persnl
and Business Serve

2.4

1.6

100.0

100.0

Economic Sector

Households

Totals

58.1
(0.8)

a. Consists of Dawn, Goldenvalley, Billings, Stark, Slope,
Hettinger, Bowman, and Adams Counties.
Source: Randall Coon, L. Larry Leidtritz, and Thor A.
Hertsgaard, Composition of North Dakota's Economic Base: A
Regional Analysis. (North Dakota State University: North
Dakota Agricultural Extension Service, March 1986)
Energy's Employment Generation.

Although services and

government currently account for a great proportion of the
state's economy, much of these services would not be in
existence without energy's economic activity and employment
generation.

These dependent sectors are therefore final

demand linkages under Watkin's staple hypothesis.

In 1984

(the most recent employment data), energy directly employed

22
7871 North Dakotans or about two percent of the State's
workforce of 323,420.

The breakdown of employment by

industry in North Dakota for selected years between 1958 and
1984 is presented in table 1.6.

Employment levels in the

energy industries alone do not accurately represent the
impact of energy on employment generation in the state.
This raw data is limited in that it cannot illustrate the
spread effects caused by energy development.
For example, Halstead and Leistritz studied the
employment impact of the coal boom on the retail industry in
Mercer County, North Dakota in terms of the change in the
number of retail establishments, the number of employees,
and the total annual payroll.29

During the eight year

period between 1972 and 1980, corresponding with the coal
boom, the number of business establishments increased from
119 to 164 to meet increasing demand caused by the coal
boom; the number of people employed in those establishments
subsequently increased from 707 to 1553; and annual payroll
increased from $3,304,000 to $11,245,521 (in 1972 dollars).
The preceeding example demonstrates the impact of an
emerging industry; unfortunately for the state, the decline
of energy brings less favorable impacts.

29John M. Halstead and F. Larry Leistritz, Impacts of
Energy Development on Mercer County, North Dakota. (Fargo:
North Dakota Agricultural Extension Service, January 1983).

23

Table 1.6

North Dakota Employment by Economic Sector,
Selected Years 1958-1984
1958

1964

1974

1984

99,670

78,000

52,670

50,870

130

113

137

194

14,430

15,291

14,869

17,528

Transportation

6,558

6,071

5,874

7,530

Communications and
Public Utilities

7,995

7,503

7,486

9,546

Agricultural Processing
and Misc Manufacturing

16,448

19,055

26,022

32,380

Retail Trade

36,400

39,226

46,639

58,358

5,070

6,230

7,479

11,242

Business and Personal
Services

12,474

15,804

21,387

33,453

Porfessional and
Social Services

14,067

17,821

24,118

37,725

Government

30,260

38,740

47,527

57,123

380

349

356

1,557

60

83

312

646

1,903

1,278

1,033

5,065

335

276

201

203

246,180

245,840

256,110

323,420

Economic Sector
Agriculture
Nonmetallic Mining
Construction

FIRE

Coal Mining
Thermal Electric
Generation
Petroleum Exploration/
Extraction
Petroleum Refining
Totals

Source: North Dakota Economic Data. (Bismarck: North Dakota
Economic Development Commission, 1988)
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Tax Dependence.

Not only have many regions of the

North Dakota economy become very dependent on the energy
industries it possesses, the state government has become
dependent on the extraction industries for a significant
proportion of state general fund revenues.

Local

government, including special districts depend on these
sources of revenue as well.
Recognizing the revenue raising potential of energy
development,-the North Dakota Legislature enacted several
laws to tax the production of energy in the past few
decades.

Taxes on energy accounted for an average of

$205,044,666 for the state general fund in the past three
bienniums or an average of 17.8 percent of general fund
revenue collections.

The state has experienced a drop in

those revenues caused mainly by a drop in world oil prices.
The impacts of these decreased energy tax collections has
impacted the state's fiscal health; all institutions of
government in the state have felt this revenue crunch.

The

Government of North Dakota has a stake in the FTA in its
effect on revenues for both the state as well as local
governments.

Table 1.7 presents the composition of state

general fund revenues; table 1.8 compares general fund tax
collections by type as a percentage of total collections.
Table 1.9 profiles each energy tax, the year enacted, and
the destination of each taxes' revenues.
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Table 1.7

Comparison of North Dakota General Fund Revenues
by Source, 1983-85, 1985-87 and 1987-89 Bienniums
(Millions of Dollars).

Source

1983-85
Biennium

Interest, Mineral
Leases, Transfers a $ 63.637

1987-89
Biennium

1985-87
Biennium

$

71.611

$

47.411

Sales and Use and
Motor Vehicle

387.131

372.221

473.923

Individual Income
Tax

150.133

153.518

203.898

Corporate Income
Tax

125.396

84.382

69.893

Energy Taxes*3

305.769

174.504

134.858

Cigarette and
Tobacco Taxes

21.268

19.401

28.460

Insurance Premium
Tax

22.899

24.499

27.932

Wholesale Liquor
Tax

11.672

11.420

11.007

2.761

4.872

3.961

18.339

21.459

21.276

$1109.005

$937,887

$1022.619

Business Privilege
Tax
Departmental Fees
and Collections
Total

a. Includes interest income, mineral leasing fees, Bank of
North Dakota profits transfer, State Mill profits transfer,
Gas Tax Administration, and other transfers.
b. Includes the five percent gross production tax, the 6.5
percent oil extraction taxe (oil and gas production; and the
coal conversion and coal severance tax.
Source: State and Local Taxes in North Dakota. (Bismarck:
State Tax Commissioner, January 1989).
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Table 1.8

Comparison of North Dakota Revenue Sources as a
Percentage of Total General Fund Collections,
1983-85, 1985-87, and 1987-89 Bienniums (Millions
of Dollars).
Revenue by Source/Total Revenue

Source
Interest, Mineral
Leases, Transfers

1983-85
Biennium

1985-87
Biennium

1987-89
Biennium

5.7

7.6

4.6

Sales and Use and
Motor Vehicle

34.9

39.7

46.3

Individual Income
Tax

13.5

16.4

19.9

Corporate Income
Tax

11.3

9.0

6.9

Energy Taxes

27.6

18.6

13.2

Cigarette and
Tobacco Taxes

1.9

2.1

2.8

Insurance Premium
Tax

2.1

2.6

2.7

Wholesale Liquor
Tax

1.1

1.2

1.1

Business Privilege
Tax

0.2

0.5

0.4

Departmental Fees
and Collections

1.7

2.3

2.1

100.0

100.0

100.0

Total

Source: State and Local Taxes in North Dakota.
State Tax Commissioner , January 1989)

(Bismarck:
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Table 1.9

Energy Taxes in North Dakota 1989: Descriptions
of Taxes and Beneficiaries of Revenues.

Tax

Year Enacted

Destination of
Revenue

Coal Severance Tax
$0.75/ton in
lieu of sales
and use tax and
property tax

1975

50% to State General
Fund
15% to trust fund
35% to coal producing
counties

Coal Conversion Tax
Based on installed
generating capacity;
in lieu of property
tax on the plant

1975

65% to State General
Fund
35% to the county of
the plant's location

Oil Extraction Tax
6.5% of gross value
of crude oil at the
well head.O
l
i

1980

90% to State General
Fund
10% to Southwest Pipe
line sinking fund and
resources trust fund

1953

A split between the
State General Fund
and the producing
County based on
tax collections per
fiscal year

Oil and Gas Gross
Production Tax
5% on the gross
value at the well
head

Source: State and Local Taxes in North Dakota. (Bismarck:
State Tax Department, January 1989)

Necessity of this Study.

The preceeding sections on

North Dakota's economy have attempted to demonstrate the
great impact the state's energy resources have on its
economy.

Now that the United States-Canada Free Trade

Agreement is to be implemented, there is a need to examine
the impacts of this agreement on the economy of North
Dakota.

The FTA has been described as a "win-win" situation
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for both countries.30

But. what will be the effect of the

FTA on the North Dakota economy?

Will there be a great

effect on the employment levels in North Dakota as a result
of this deal?

Will state collections of energy taxes be

affected by this deal?
governments be impacted?

If so, how will the state and local
The following chapters set out to

answer these questions.

o Q

External Affairs Canada, The Canada-US Free Trade
Agreement.

CHAPTER II
THEORIES OF FREE TRADE
This chapter examines theories of free trade from the
original advocate of trade, Adam Smith (1776) to the more
quantitative models of the mid-twentieth century to the
present.

Also included in this chapter is an examination of

literature devoted to the economic effects of a United
States-Canada free trade area.

Such an examination acts as

a framework for analyzing the effects of the United StatesCanada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on the North Dakota
economy, and more specifically for the purposes of this
paper, its energy sector.
Classical Trade Theories
Absolute Advantage.
Adam Smith.

The original advocate of trade was

In his book The Wealth of Nations. Smith

attacked the mercantilists view on trade as being selfish
and without consideration for economic efficiency or long
term consequences.1

The mercantilist view on trade held

that a country should try to gain financially any way it
1Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Random
House, 1937, first published in 1776). By economic
efficiency, Adam Smith referred to the efficient use of
labor in production. Today economic efficiency addresses
the uses of capital as well.
29
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could, usually at the expense of others, and often without
regard for the aggregate welfare of the inhabitants of the
mercantilist country itself.2

Further, the most important

way for a nation to become rich and powerful was to export
more than it imported.3

Smith argued there was a better way

to conduct trade that would be beneficial to all involved.
Even though a country could make short term gains by
practicing mercantilism, it could reap long term benefits if
it was cognizant of the efficiency in the use of its
resources.4

In his arguments Smith studied mercantilists to

re-evalute a country's motivation for trade for the purpose
of developing a more efficient basis for trade.
Smith argued that for trade to be economically
beneficial to a country, that country should produce only
those goods that it can produce at a lower "real" cost
relative to other countries.

A country should import only

those commodities that it cannot produce cheaper than other
countries.

Smith referred to real cost as the amount of

2David A. Lake and Jeffry A. Frieden, International
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth.
(New York: St. Martins, 1987).
The difference would be settled by an inflow of
precious metals, mostly gold. For further discussion of the
mercantilist view of trade see Dominick Salvatore,
International Economics. 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill,
1984); or David A. Lake and Jeffry A. Frieden, International
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth.
(New York: St. Martins, 1987).
4Ibid.
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labor that is necessary to produce commodities.

As Adam

Smith put it:
The natural advantages which one country has over
another in producing particular commodities are
sometimes so great, that it is acknowledged by all
the world to be in vain to struggle with them. By
means of glasses, hotbeds, and hotwalls, very good
grapes can be raised in Scotland, and very good wine
can be made of them at about thirty times the
expense for which at least equally good can be
bought from foreign countries. Would it be
reasonable to prohibit the importation of all
foreign wines, merely to encourage the making of
claret and burgundy in Scotland? But if there would
be manifest absurdity in turning towards any
employment, thirty times more of the capital and
industry of the country, than would be necessary to
purchase from foreign countries, an equal quantity
of the commodities wanted, there must be an
absurdity ... in turning towards any such employment
a thirtieth, or even a three-hundreth part more of
either. Whether the advantages which one country
has over another, be natural or aquired, is in this
respect of no consequence.
Trade would then be undertaken according to the amount
of labor input into production.

For example if product "a"

of country "1" takes two hours to produce and product "b" of
country "2" takes four hours to produce, country "1" would
have to give up two units of commodity "a" to obtain one
unit of commodity "b."

Thus inherent in this discussion is

a medium for exchange that is currently done with some type
of currency.

Benefits that accrue when a country engages in

trade are received when a country imports a commodity at a
lower real cost through trade than through direct production
at home:
By improving a more extensive market for whatever
part of the produce of their labor may exceed the5
5Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations: 424-425.
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home consumption, it [foreign trade] encourages them
to improve its productive powers, and to augment its
annual produce to the utmost.6
Unlike the mercantilist view, a nation engaging in
production based on its absolute advantage does not gain at
the expense of another nation; nations gain simultaneously.
This gain would be achieved only if trade were free of
distortions among countries.

Smith argued that governments

shouldn't get involved in regulating trade.

If governments

refrain from regulating the free market economy, the result
should be countries taking their respective place in the
production of goods based on absolute advantage.78
Smith's absolute advantage theorum addressed only the
production factor of labor, which does place a limitation on
his argument.

Smith also fails to take into account that

some nations cannot produce many or even any products more
efficiently, leaving resources in that country
underutilized, and the nation's labor force under-employed.
Thus a disadvantaged nation rationalizes the application of
tariffs to encourage domestic production as being
•
, •
o
economically efficient.
But among nations there are a
number of factor endowments9 that may be unequal and have to

6Ibid, 415.
7Ibid.
8The history of world trade is laden with tariff
applications to encourage less efficient production. For a
discussion of tariff history as it relates to global power
see David A. Lake and Jeffry A. Frieden, International
Political Economy; Perspectives on Global Wealth and Power.

33
be taken into consideration.

In addressing the weaknesses

of Smith's theory, David Ricardo takes the theory of
absolute advantage, embellishes it, and expands the theory
of trade with his own argument, comparative advantage.
Comparative Advantage.

David Ricardo theorized that a

nation's basis for its production decisions, and ultimately
its import/export balance, should not be based on absolute
advantage of production as Adam Smith argued.

Ricardo

argued that comparative advantage relative to production
possibilities should be the basis for such decisions.10
Ricardo argues that even if a nation does not enjoy an
absolute advantage in the production of a commodity, that
nation would choose to specialize in the commodity that it
has the least absolute disadvantage in production.11

The

commodity in which the nation has the least absolute
disadvantage becomes the commodity in which the nation has a
comparative advantage to produce.

Unlike Smith's absolute

advantage, the gist of Ricardo's argument is that a nation
would produce the most efficient product in a disadvantaged
situation.

The nation should also try to import the

commodity in which its absolute disadvantage is the
greatest.

Attesting to the strength of Ricardo's analysis,

------Q-----------------------------------------------------------------

Factor endowments are the natural resources that a
country possesses, e.g. land, the quality of its workforce,
the weather common to an area.
10.
.
Piero Sraffa, ed. David Ricardo: Works and
Correspondence. (Cambridge, England: University Press for
the Royal Economic Society, 1951).
1:LIbid.
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the law of comparative advantage is one of the most famous
and still largely unchallenged laws of economics, and forms
the base-line for modern trade theories.^-2
Critique of Classical Theories of Trade.

International

trade theory appears to have grown in small embellishments
rather than in great leaps and bounds, again attesting to
the acceptance of Ricardo's arguments.

But there has been

some recent criticism of classical international trade
theories because of their inability to accurately model
increasingly complex modern economies.
is occuring in international trade.

A quiet revolution

Out of this revolution

has emerged a quite different way of thinking about
international trade, one that preserves some of the
traditional view but calls other parts of the traditional
view into question.

The classical trade theories themselves

do not address consumer preferences, elasticity of demand,
capital cost considerations, factor endowments, and thus
serve only as a reference point in an increasingly complex
trading world.

In analyzing North Dakota's path to economic

efficiency, we must be cognizant not only of North Dakota's
comparative advantage based on its factor endowments, but
also the limits of those endowments.
For example, as North Dakota agricultural production
began to receive challenges from rival producers, it has had
to re-evaluate its seemingly absolute advantage in
agricultural production.

Factor endowments have1
2

12Paul Krugman, "Rethinking International Trade,"
Business Economics. April 1988.
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historically leaned in North Dakota's favor.

But, with

North Dakota's factor endowments it still finds advantage in
agricultural production, and more recently, with the
discovery of oil in North Dakota, has found advantage in
extracting petroleum.

North Dakota chooses not to produce

other commodities such as steel in the state because of its
lack of resources needed to produce steel (with the
exception of energy) and its disadvantage compared to other
states.
In analyzing North Dakota's economy, we must ask
whether it would be economically efficient if it put all
efforts into agricultural production and energy production
and forego all other production opportunities because of the
state's factor endowments.

What about the boom and bust

cycles associated with such a resource-based economy?

What

about a balance of imports and exports in one or both of
those industries so that North Dakota does discover a
comparative advantage?

The classical theories do not take

into account the nature of individual economies, and for the
purpose of this paper, the uniqueness of North Dakota's
resource-based economy.

Thus the classical theories serve

only as a reference point in discovering efficient economic
activity in the state.

Because economic analysis tends to

follow the line of least mathematical resistance, the
traditional approach has been to emphasize country
differences and deemphasize the advantages of specialization
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per se, as reasons for international
trade. 13

.
Recognizing

the weaknesses of the classical trade theories, the most
modern trade theories utilize comparative advantage and try
to explain production in terms of opportunity cost theory.
This orientation will be used in chapter four to determine
North Dakota's most efficient production position.
Modern Trade Theories
Constant Costs.

Working within the boundaries of

comparative advantage, a nation in its production decision
and ultimately in its trading decisions, has to consider the
marginal rate of transformation among the commodities in its
production possibility curve.1
14
3

In the absence of trade, or

autarky, a nations's production possibilities curve or
frontier also presents the boundaries of consumption for a
nation.

With trade, a nation can specialize in the

commodity of its comparative advantage, exchange part if
this for the commodity of its comparative disadvantage, and
end up consuming more of both commodities than without
trade.15

As a nation moves toward specialization in one

13Paul Krugman, "Rethinking International Trade."
14Holly Ulbrich, International Trade and Finance:
Theory and Policy. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1983).
The marginal rate of transformation is the amount of a
commodity that a nation must give up producing in order to
produce more of a second commodity. A nation's production
possibility curve shows all possible combinations of the two
commodities that a nation can produce by fully utilizing all
of its factors of production with the best technology
available.
1C

, ,

,

,

Dominick Salvatore, International Economics.
(Englewood Cliffs: MaGraw-Hill, 1984).
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commodity, the gains from trade increase as it becomes more
and more specialized.

As long as one nation's production is

large enough to meet its need for a commodity, that nation
will not stop short of total specialization.16

Any surplus

would be available for export in exchange for commodities
not produced by that nation.

In this relatively simple

model, the nation does not have to face the situation of
increasing costs or opportunity costs in production
decisions.

Thus trade decisions would be easily and

accurately made.

Unfortunately, production decisions do not

appear to be so simple.
Increasing Costs.

The weakness of the constant costs

model was pointed out by trade theorists who recognized that
nations face increasing opportunity costs.

The main

result of replacing the constant cost assumption with
increasing costs is to explain the real-world phemonenom of
partial specialization rather than total specialization in
the production of one commodity.18

The reality of the

trading situation is that it is more likely for a nation to
face increasing opportunity costs or an increasing marginal
rate of transformation in producing more units of a

16Holly Ulbrich, International Trade and Finance:
Theory and Policy.
17For example see A .D . Woodland, International Trade
and Resource Allocation. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1982) ;
or Miltiodes Chacholiades, Principles of International
Economics. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981).
no
,
,
,
Holly Ulbrich, International Trade and Finance:
Theory and Policy.
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commodity.

The increasing amounts of one commodity that a

nation must give up in order to release just enough
resources to produce each additional unit of another
commodity illustrates increasing costs.

At a point on a

nation's production possibility curve, the nation's
production of its chosen commodity will equal the cost of
the imported commodity.
this point.

Thus production should be set at

Because of the typical slope of the production

possibilities curve, a nation gains less and less as it
specializes further relative to the commodity it chooses to
import.19

Thus there is a need to determine the most

efficient production level, which is by no means an easy
task.
Heckscher-Ohlin Theory (H-0).

This theory focuses on

the difference in relative factor endowments and the price
of factors between nations as the most important
determinants of efficient production and trade.
Agricultural producers (such as North Dakota) require an
endowment of fertile land, adequate rainfall, and weather.
The H-0 theorum postulates that each nation will export the
commodity intensive in its relatively abundant and cheap
factor, and import the commodities intensive in its
relatively scarce and expensive factor.20

Although very

similar to comparative advantage, what H-0 doesn't explain
is why North Dakota's export markets choose North Dakota's
19Ibid.
9n

,

Dominick Salvatore, International Trade.
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products versus other suppliers in situations where prices
are similar.

And further, H-0 takes into account only

natural resources of a nation (for instance crude oil).
However, a significant proportion of production is not
affected by climate or natural resources, e.g. the garment
industry, and thus the theory is somewhat limited in its
applicability.
Factor Price Equalization Theorem.

Developed as a

corollary to-Heckscher-Ohlin Theory, this theory postulates
that reducing barriers to trade will lead to the elimination
or reduction in the pre-trade difference in relative and
absolute factor prices between nations.

This situation is

borne out because:
When protection is removed, demand for the abundant
factor will increase and demand for the scarce
resource will decrease, raising the price of the
abundant factor and lowering the price of the scarce
factor. Thus, the return of the two factors of
production will tend to converge. These two
converges as a result of trade are known as factor
price equalization.21*
This extension of H-0 was necessary because H-0 fails to
explain a substantial portion of international trade; for
instance, trade in similar but not identical products, e.g.
American versus German automobiles.
A second factor ignored by H-0 that has to be taken
into account in a nation's production decision is the
potential for economies of scale. ^

Economies of scale

21Holly Ulbrich, International Trade and Finance:
Theory and Policy.
Op

Dominick Salvatore, International Trade.

40
refers to a situation in which output grows proportionately
more than the increase in the use of input or factors of
production.

If a country takes economies of scale into

consideration in its production and trading decisions,
resources will theoretically be better utilized.
A third factor ignored by H-0 are technological gaps
and their relationship to product cycles.

A great deal of

exports of industrial nations are based on the introduction
of new materials and new production processes.

A nation may

produce in an unchallenged manner, at least at first
development of the technology.

This occurs until the have-

not countries copy the technology and undersell the nation
that introduced the technology.23

But when will the nation

copying the technology be in a position to produce more
efficiently than the nation introducing the technology?
This situation is more difficult to calculate.
A fourth factor that must be considered are the costs
associated with the transportation of goods to the export
market.

A commodity will be traded only if the pre-trade

price difference between the two nations exceeds the cost of
transporting it between them.

In addition, when trade is in

equilibrium, the price of the traded commodity in the
importing nation exceeds the price of the same commodity in
the exporting nation by the cost of transportation.24

23Ibid.
24A.D. Woodland, International Trade and Resource
Allocation (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1982).
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Hechscher-Ohlin theory neglects transportation, and in
analyzing North Dakota's position in the North American
market, the transportation of commodities to final markets
is an important consideration.
Two other important factors which must also be taken
into account in the analysis of trade are alluded to in the
factor price equilization theory: changes in taste and
changes in supply.

When a nation changes its taste for a

commodity and seeks substitute products, the pure efficiency
argument of production becomes distorted.
situation applies to a shortage of supply.

A similar
When the price

of a commodity is perfectly inelastic2
26 to change in price,
5
e.g. there is a taste preference for the commodity in short
supply, efficient trade will be adversely affected.

Thus as

an analysis of trade in energy between North Dakota and
Canada is undertaken, the preference and consumption
patterns relative to energy cannot be ignored.

The patterns

of supply in a tariff-free trading situation (the current
U.S.-Canada energy situation) may follow rational economic
efficiency.

The challenge is to discover the rationale for

the current North Dakota-Canada energy trading relationship,
which does not necessarily follow the path of greatest
economic efficiency.

25Ibid.
26When the price of a commodity is perfectly inelastic,
demand for that commodity will not change regardless of
increases or decreases in the commodity's price.
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Analysis of Normative Trade Theories
Countries trade for a number of reasons.

The main

reason that a nation engages in trade is that it is to a
country's advantage to do so; nations benefit from trade.
When a country specializes in producing certain products and
relies on other countries to produce other products for
importation, resources can theoretically be allocated in a
more efficient and productive manner in each of the
countries.27* The complicating factors to a seemingly simple
analysis are the non-economic motivations for trade, or lack
of trade.

For instance, nations may trade for cultural

reasons, or may patronize local production without regard
for economic efficiency.
The scholars previously mentioned, with the exception
of Adam Smith, all argued that free trade, in which each
country would look for its comparative advantage and produce
accordingly, would result in the most efficient use of
resources and would benefit each country involved.

The

desirability of free trade is one economic condition that
almost all economists agree on.

More specifically, the

theory of comparative advantage remains one of the least
challenged laws in economics. °

However, given the

complexity of modern economies, the historic belief in the
classical theories of free trade are waning somewhat, giving

P7James C. Ingram International
•
•
Economics
2nd ed. (New
York: Wiley 1986).
90

,

f

Paul Krugman, "Rethinking International Trade."
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way to more modern theories that deal with a number of more
complicated variables and more complex analytical
techniques.
Unlike the theory of comparative advantage, which
emphasizes that countries specialize in order to take
advantage of their differences, a more recent alternative
view attributes trade to the inherent advantages of
specialization or trade based on increasing returns.
Because comparative advantage is much more easily placed
into a mathematical formula than is increasing returns,
•
•
•
9Q
increasing returns has been less widely acknowledged.
The central notion of normative trade theories is that
there are gains from trade and free trade is pareto-superior
to any system containing tariffs.2
30
9

The question addressed

by the modern trade theories is the net benefit of a free
trade zone for the whole of the country, as each part of the
country will contribute to the aggregate result.

But as the

pareto criterion points out if a net benefit is the result
of free trade, this will be desirable regardless of the
costs to the individual parts of the country.

This is the

danger to a state such as North Dakota which doesn't have
the resources or the political clout to protect its own
interests regardless of any potential negative consequences
29Ibid.
30Samuelson, P.A. "The Gains from International Trade",
5 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. 1939:
195-205. A pareto superior situation refers to a situation
in which a country as a whole would gain economically from a
strategy.
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of the actions of the remainder of the union.

Free trade

per se, thus is not the panacea that was pronounced in the
older theories of international trade for regions "falling
through the cracks" in the name of economic efficiency.

New

trade theories take into account a much more complex world,
including many factor endowments:
The new free trade position ... is not the same as
the old. Instead of advocating free trade as part of
a blanket endorsement of free markets, today's
international economists advocate it as a reasonable
rule of thumb in an imperfect world. 1
Thus as scholars, politicians, and laymen consider the
impacts of removing barriers to trade, we are not only
concerned with a gain for aggregate welfare, but with the
impact on "pet" sectors and the politics that accompany the
protection of those sectors.

Unfortunately the inability to

model complex economies given these non-economic
considerations places a limitation on our ability to
generalize among individual sectors.
Perspectives on a U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area
There have been numerous attempts to explore the
potential effects of a U.S.-Canada free trade area.

The

orientation of most of these studies has been to determine
the gains or losses of aggregate welfare incurred by an
economy as a result of the reduction of tariffs, and in some
cases, nontariff barriers.

Unfortunately, there has been

relatively little study on the economic effects of the3
1

31Paul Krugman, "Rethinking International Trade."
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current U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.

What study there

has been has relied heavily on the more general welfare
effects of the FTA on the American and Canadian economies.
The weakness of these studies lies in the accurate modeling
of each nation's economy.

Although each researcher is

careful to point out the limitations of his/her model, the
results of this research has to be taken with appropriate
caveats.

Unfortunately one of the most important factors in

determining the effects of an economic policy is also one of
the most complex: the quantifying of individual and group
behavior (non-economic variables).

The problem becomes one

of accurately modeling and quantifying this behavior within
an economic model.

None of the following studies adequately

addresses consumer behavior, granted however, that consumer
preference is extremely difficult to accurately quantify.
A second limitation of the analyses of U.S.-Canada free
trade is that many of the studies have been undertaken to
estimate empirically the gains to only parts of each
country's economy from various forms of trade
liberalization.

We must also utilize these findings with

the appropriate caveats in generalizing to other sectors
because many of these studies have limited data and missing
data.

The models are very limited in their ability to

accurately portray the Canadian and American economies with
a partial equilibrium analysis as a result. ^
32John Whalley, ed. Canada-U.S. Free Trade. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1985). A partial equilibrium
analysis considers only a portion of the economy rather the
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A third limitation of utilizing the research to make
generalizations to an individual sector is the orientation
of the researcher him/herself.

There are numerous

theoretical perspectives to the modeling the American and
Canadian economies.

Results of the analyses are many times

contingent on the assumptions of the nature of each
country's economy.

Presented in this section are the

highlights of the research on a free trade area, along with
an attempt to make sense out of the differing modeling
perspectives.

Chapter four will utilize these economic

perspectives in the analysis of the FTA as a framework for
North Dakota energy industries.

Some of these perspectives

are alluded to, some are explicitly applied.
An American-Canadian Economic Union - Wannacot and
Wannacot.

One of the most complete and respected economic

analyses of an American-Canadian economic union was put
forth by Ronald and Paul Wannacot in 1967.33

This study

modeled the American and Canadian manufacturing economies to
determine the effects on both the American and Canadian
economies as well as the impact of bilateral free trade on
each country's economic sovereignty.
The major finding of the study is that Canada would be
the big winner with tariff elimination because of economies
entire economy of a nation, thus making the analysis easier
while at the same time placing a limitation on the utility
of the model.
33Ronald Wonnacot and Paul Wonnacot, Free Trade Between
the United States and Canada: The Potential Economic Effects
(Cambridge, Massachusets: Harvard University Press, 1967).
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of scale considerations.

Canada's guaranteed market (its

internal market) is small relative to the size of the U.S.
market.

By gaining more complete access to the U.S. market,

Canada would increase its marketing base tenfold.

The gap

in productivity performance between Canadian and American
manufacturing would narrow considerably and perhaps be
eliminated under bilateral free trade.34

The important

qualification made by Wonnacot and Wonnacot is that gains
from tariff elimination would not be quickly realized.

The

longer the time horizon considered, the higher the expected
gains would be.

In a subsequent assessment of the potential

impacts of a free trade arrangement between Canada and the
United States, Ronald Wonnacot estimated that Canada would
be the winner with total gains expected from a free trade
arrangement to be 8.2% of pre-agreement gross national
product.35

The United States would gain little, if any,

from a free trade arrangement.36
Williams f1978).

In a multisectoral analysis of the

Canadian and American economies and the determinants for
gains from tariff elimination, Williams found that
industries that would expand and benefit under free trade
are the ones which share at least some of the following
characteristics: they face a relatively high tariff; they
34Ibid.
35Ronald J. Wonnacot, Canada/United States Free Trade:
Problems and Opportunities. (Ottawa: Ontario Ecnomic
Council, 1985).
36Ibid.
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receive little protection from a domestic tariff; they have
higher input costs due to the existance of the tariff; and
they produce more end products.37

Williams concludes that

the joint removal of tariffs in Canada and the United States
would favor end-product manufacturing, but not raw resource
development.38

William's prediction of gains to the

American and Canadian economies as a result of the removal
of current tariffs on tariff-affected, manufactured goods
would preclude North Dakota energy or other energy for that
matter.

Raw energy and electricity currently face no

tariffs or receive no protections from existing domestic
tariffs.

Thus North Dakota's energy sector would not be

affected if William's assumptions are valid.
Canada as a Price Taker.

The price taker model has

been a popular model to determine welfare effects of a
Canada-U.S. free trade area.

An important variable in

determining the effects of the FTA is the nature of Canada
as a trading country versus the United States; i.e. is
Canada a price taking nation?

The price taker theory

assumes that a large country would have the ability to
affect the world price of a commodity because of the sheer
market size of that country.

A small country, without the

means to manipulate the price of a commodity is considered

37James R. Williams, Resources. Tariffs and Trade;
Ontario's Stake (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1978) .
38 Ibid.
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to be a price taker.39

The limitation of this model is that

the welfare implications of the model do not hold if restof-the-world prices change as a consequence of a U.S.-Canada
free trade agreement.40
If Canada is a price taker, Hill and Whalley argue that
American aggregate welfare in a free trade agreement would
decline while Canadian aggregate welfare would increase.41
The small country (Canada) would experience a "terms of
trade" effect; i.e. the country imposing the tariff
t
effectively taxes producers in the exporting country.

The

actions of the "large" (American) economy may affect the
prices of the traded goods, whereas the actions of the
smaller country (Canada) in levying a tariff puts the
producers of the large country at a distinct production
disadvantage when the tariffs are removed because the
smaller country would already have production facilities in
place to supply the trade markets.42

The extent of the gain

39Drusilla K. Brown and Robert M. Stern "A Modeling
Perspective," in Stern, Tretize and Whalley, Perspectives on
a Free Trade Agreement. (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1987).
40Ibid.
41Roderick Hill and John Whalley, "Introduction:
Canada-U.S. Free Trade," in John Whalley, ed., Canada-United
States Free Trade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1985) .
42Earl H. Fry, "Trends in Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Discussions: 1911-1986, in A.R. Riggs and Tom Velk,
Canadian-American Free Trade: Historical. Political and
Economic Dimensions (Halifax: Institute for Research on
Public Policy, 1987).
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in the Canadian economy and the loss in the American economy
is contingent on the individual research.
The reason for the behavior of a price taking country
does not vary within the research, however.

First, it must

be assumed that Canada imports from the United States at the
world price.

The price that Canadian consumers must pay for

a commodity eguals the world price plus the tariff imposed
by Canada.

Canada exports to the U.S. at the world price,

although U.S. consumers pay the world price plus the U.S.
tariff.

The effect on aggregate welfare becomes prevelant

when the tariffs are removed.43
After the removal of Canadian tariffs, the price of
American imports into the Canadian market falls by the
amount of the former Canadian tariff.

Imports rise as a

result and Canadian consumers receive the price and
efficiency benefits of the trade creation.44

Canada now

exports to the U.S. at the U.S. domestic price (the world
price plus the U.S. tariff which still applies to all
imports except those from Canada).

Canada's producers thus

retain tariff revenue that otherwise would have been
collected by the U.S. government.45

Canadian terms of trade

43Roderick Hill and John Whalley, "Introduction:
Canada-U.S. Free Trade.
44Drusilla K. Brown and Robert Stern, "A Modeling
Perspective."
AR
^JEarl H. Fry, "Trends in Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Discussions."
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and Canadian welfare are therefore improved with a free
trade arrangement.
In contrast to the Canadian gain in welfare, the U.S.
is made worse off.

Commodities from the rest of the world

trade are still subject to the U.S. tariff.

At the same

time, the United States will have shifted some impacts from
low-cost rest-of-the-world suppliers to higher cost Canadian
suppliers (compared to other countries). u
of trade reduces U.S. welfare.4
47
6

This diversion

The reason for this drop

in welfare is directly related to the distorting effect of
tariffs on trade.

Producers from world markets remain

theoretically more efficient, but the removal of tariffs on
Canadian goods while maintaining tariffs on other foreign
goods makes Canadian goods look more efficiently produced
based on price, but this actually isn't the case.

The

creation of a free trade area could actually harm both
countries, however.
If rest-of-the-world prices change as a consequence of
the free trade area, the Canadian increase in aggregate
welfare will not be realized.

If Canada is a price taker,

Dauphin argues that both American and Canadian trade would
actually decline in the world market if a free trade
arrangement takes force.48

But this situation would be

46Roderick Hill and John Whalley, "Introduction:
Canada-U.S. Free Trade."
47Ibid.
AO

t

Roma Dauphin, The Impact of Free Trade on Canada
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1978).
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reversed when: (1) Supply of American goods on the world
market falls, thus raising its price; and (2) American
demands for imports from the rest of the world would decline
(causing a fall in price).49

On both accounts the U.S.

terms of trade would improve at the expense of its trading
partners.

If the FTA does cause other countries to engage

in trade liberalization in the multilateral trading system
as appears to be one of the motivations of the U.S. in
reaching the FTA, then perhaps the welfare losses will be
reversed with aggregate welfare gain for the United States
economy.

Thus the welfare gains would be a sound motivation

for seeking a free trade agreement with Canada, if Canada is
indeed a price taker.
Product Differentiation.

A substantial body of

literature is devoted to this type of analysis.50

The

findings of this research continually point to Canadian
gains from a free trade arrangement.

The product

differentiation effect occurs when the large country, in
this case the United States, is adversely affected if trade
is diverted from the small country, Canada.

Similarly,

Canada will gain if it trades exclusively with the United
r

*i

States. 1

But if both countries continue to trade to the

49Drusilla K. Brown and Robert M. Stern, "A Modeling
Perspective."
See for example Eitan Berglas, "Preferential Trading
Theory: The n Commodity Case," 87 Journal of Political
Economy. April 1979; or Richard G. Lipsey, The Theory of
Customs Unions: A General Equilibrium Analysis (London:
Weidenfelt and Nicholson, 1970).
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same extent or increase their exports in the world market
after a free trade arrangement, both may lose relative to
aggregate welfare.5
52 The reasons for this loss in welfare
are two fold.
First, a selected tariff reduction will remove
distortion between domestic goods and imports from the
associated trading partner, which is welfare improving.

But

a new distortion is introduced between imports from the
preferred country (when produced less efficiently) and those
from third countries (when produced more efficiently).
Removing one distortion while creating another distortion
does not necessarily improve welfare.53* Complete tariff
removal by one trade partner will give optimal results only
if demand for the import from third countries is completely
independent of the price of the import from the preferred
partner.

This demand may be affected by consumer

preferences, elasticity of demand, and supply
considerations.
This first qualification of welfare loss is somewhat
complicated because all countries can have some control over
5iAlthough the United States trades with other
countries other than Canada, Canada is the dominant trading
partner and would be near to this exclusivity requirement,
thus this situation would point to Canadian gains.
“^Paul S. Armmgton, "A Theory of Demand for Products
Distinguished by Place of Production," IMF Staff Papers vol
16 March 1969 quoted in Stern, Trezise, and Whalley,
Perspectives on a Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
53Drusilla K. Brown and Robert M. Stern, "A Modeling
Perspective."
54Ibid.
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their export prices by altering tariffs on imports.

For

example, a tariff reduction on Canadian imports from the
U.S. will displace domestically produced goods in favor of
imports.

As the price of Canadian goods falls on the world

market Canada's terms of trade deteriorates.

On the other

hand, a tariff reduction on U.S. imports from Canada will
allow Canadian penetration of the U.S. market.

The increase

in U.S. demand for Canada's exports will raise the price of
the Canadian-produced goods on the world market, thus
improving the terms of trade.55

The welfare effect for

Canada thus depends on the relative importance of the trade
creation and import penetration effects that will be
associated with tariff changes between the two countries.
The second reason for a loss of welfare is based on the
relative size of the two countries and its increasing
importance compared with other traditional models.56

A

unilateral removal of Canadian tariffs on imports would
deteriorate Canada's terms of trade.

Multilateral free

trade, on the other hand, would give Canada significant
welfare gains.

For example, using tariff and non-tariff

data from 1977, Hamilton and Whalley used product
differentiation to determine the effects of bilateral
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs).57

They

55Ibid.
56Ibid.
57Bob Hamilton and John Whalley, "Geographically
Discriminatory Trade Arrangments," 67 Review of Economics
and Statistics (August 1985).

55
found that the bilateral removal of tariffs and NTBs would
result in increases in welfare for both countries.

The size

of the gain would be contingent on the differing levels of
initial tariff protection before tariff elimination.

The

U.S. could expect higher gains from a country with highly
protected, newly industrializing economies that have
significantly higher levels of protection for domestic
industries.58
Hamilton and Whalley's study finds that given the above
conditions for gains in welfare, the U.S. would gain and
Canada would lose from a free trade agreement.

Canada would

be a loser because its tariffs are significantly higher on
average than the are American tariffs.

Canada's aggregate

welfare would also decline with a free trade arrangement
because Canada's terms of trade would decline usurping the
benefits of trade creation from tariff reductions.

Hamilton

and Whalley's analysis is not sectorally-based, however.

It

is a general equilibrium analysis of the aggregate economies
of both countries.
Scale Economies and Perfect Competition.

A third area

of knowledge in predicting the impact of a free trade
arrangement between the U.S. and Canada is directly
concerned with the presence or the potential to create
economies of scale in production.

It has generally been

agreed among free trade scholars that the United States
economy has established economies of scale for its domestic
58 Ibid.

56
market because of the sheer volume of goods that are
.
•
,
,
,
RQ
produced in this country for consumption in this country.
The fact that the United States has the sheer number of
comsumers to make the production of goods and services more
efficient creates economies of scale even without
international trade. u

The most pressing issue in the free

trade debate thus becomes Canada's ability to achieve
economies of scale by having unimpeded access to the larger
American market and the effect on American production.
(
Brown and Stern argued that Canada's historical import
restrictions have resulted in inefficient Canadian
production as indicated by suboptimal plant size, production
short runs, and excessive product diversity.5
61
*
9

Adding to

the problem of Canada's historically inefficient mode of
production is the presence of American trade barriers.
Those barriers are in the market most important to Canadian
producers who try to maximize efficiency by exporting excess
production to the U.S.

Brown and Stern provided a caveat in

their examination of tariff elimination in the Canadian and
American economies: it is not possible to prove that a
country will gain from trade liberalization when economies
of trade are present.

The reason for this cautious finding

59For example see Drusilla Brown and Robert Stern, "A
Modeling Perspective"; or Bob Hamilton and John Whalley,
"Geographically Discriminatory Trade Arrangements."
ft

0

For example see Drusilla Brown and Robert M. Stern,
"A Modeling Perspective."
61Drusilla K. Brown and Robert M. Stern, "A Modeling
Prespective."
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is that other factors exist in an economy such as comsumer
preference, the elasticity of demand, and the presence of
imperfect competition created by the presence of monopolies
and oligopolies.62

Other advocates of the FTA argue that

tariff reduction will permit Canadian firms to realize
economies of scale that were not otherwise available.63
Cox and Harris divised a model to test for the effects
of creating economies of scale in the American-Canadian
market place and found that welfare gains for Canada would
be positive, but the gains would be much lower for Canada
than the product differentiation or the price taker model
had indicated.64

The gains in Canadian welfare would result

through three channels.

First, tariff reductions would

result in greater Canadian penetration in the American
market.

Second, lower prices in Canada would force Canadian

producers to produce more efficiently, which would lower
prices and force greater efficiency in the use of capital
and factor endowments.

Third, the extent of the results

would depend on perceived elasticity of demand.65

If demand

for an American product is near perfect elasticity, then the

62Ibid.
63For example see Elhanan Helpman and Paul Krugman,
Market Structure and Foreign Trade: Increasing Returns,
Imperfect Competition and the International Economy (MIT
Press, 1985).
64David Cox and Richard Harris, "Trade Liberalization
and Industrial Organization: Some Estimates for Canada," 93
Journal of Political Economy (February 1985).
65Ibid.
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Canadian gain from tariff reduction will be maximized.
Conversely, the gain will be minimized if demand for a
product is inelastic.
Reviewing literature on economies of scale shows there
has been a fair amount of disagreement of the effects of
scale economies and gains from trade by Canadian
producers.66

The Cox-Harris model projected real income

increases for Canadians at about nine percent with
employment to rise about five percent.67

Wilkinson points

out that appropriate caveats have to be made in interpreting
these results.

The nine percent gains in real income in

Canada is predicated on the Americans and Canadians having
unimpeded access to each other's markets in all sector
markets.

Given the fact that the FTA does not provide for

free trade in all sectors and does not clearly address
existance of subsidies and other non-tariff barriers, the
gains have to be re-evaluated.

Wilkinson reduces the

expected gains to about two to three percent in Canadian
aggregate income.

As far as limiting the usefulness of

ft ft

For a more complete discussion, see Allan M. Maslove
and Stanley L. Winer, eds. Knocking on the Back Door:
Canadian Perspectives on the Political Economy of Freer
Trade with the United States. Halifax: The Institute for
Research on Public Policy (1987) or Paul Krugman "Rethinking
International Trade," Business Economics. April 1988.
C *7

David Cox and Richard Harris, "Trade Liberalization
and Industrial Organization: Some Estimates for Canada."
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Bruce B. Wilkinson, "Canada-United States Free Trade:
Setting the Dimensions," in Allan Maslove and Stanley Winer,
Knocking on the Back Door.
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employment gains by a large-scale model, Cornell argues that
large scale models are more appropriate for determining the
effects on individual sectors of the economy, but are
relatively weak in determining the effects for the economy
as a whole. u

The weakness in the modeling is the inability

of the model to take into account the traditional
consumption patterns and idioscracies of each sector in the
economy.

The question then becomes how has an absence of

tariff situation affected scale economies in trade in
energy?
A further contribution to the determination of scale
economy effects of a free trade arrangement on the American
and Canadian economies was made by Brown and Stern.

The

method of this study was to model the world economy using
four regions: Canada, the U.S., a group of the remaining
world industrial countries, and the rest of the world's
countries.

The findings of this study illustrate the

complex nature of the world trading system.

First, the

results indicate that a free trade arrangement would result
in a small increase in welfare for the United States, but
there would be no change in Canada's aggregate welfare.*
72
*
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Canada does not gain with a free trade arrangement because
removal of comparatively high Canadian tariffs reduces total
demand for Canadian-produced goods.

Equilibrium is restored

by a fall in the price of Canadian goods and a depreciation
of the Canadian dollar.

There would also be very little

change (less than one percent) change in sectoral employment
in all sectors.

There would be some employment dislocation

in particular sectors, especially in Canada, but this
dislocation would be moderated if the free trade arrangement
were phased in over a period of time.73
Secondly, imports and exports for both the U.S. and
Canada show increases in intra-industry trade for most
sectors but not all.

For the U.S., the sectors that would

experience gains are agriculture, petroleum products, and
transportation equipment; for Canada, footware, petroleum
products, and transportation equipment.

The effects on the

total output of each economy is expected to be very small,
as all sectors would show output effects of less than one
percent.

Output would rise in the U.S. and fall in Canada

in food and kindred products, textiles, printing and
publishing, chemicals, glass products, metal products,
electric machinery, and several non-tradables.

The opposite

occurs in wood products, petroleum products, nonferous
metals, transport equipment, mining, and quarrying.74

73Ibid.
74 Ibid.
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Conclusion of the Computational Models.

The preceding

dicussion of computation models can be easily summed up as
to the value for application to the problem at hand, the
analysis of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.

The

differing orientations of these models leaves us some
concern as to their utility in predicting the effect of a
free trade arrangement specifically on the energy sector of
the United States, let alone North Dakota's energy sectors.
None of the quantitative studies looked specifically at the
ramifications for American and Canadian energy production.
Few of the quantitative observations mentioned energy, and
where energy was mentioned, the discussion was brief and
limited to petroleum products and not raw petroleum, natural
gas, coal, or the sale of electricity.

The literature is

less helpful for the analysis in chapter four as a result.
But there are three important questions that must be asked
at this point.

First, since no tariffs on energy existed

before the FTA, will the signing of the agreement itself
change trade behavior?

If the preceding literature is

accurate, the implications should be limited.

Secondly,

related to the existance of nontariff barriers, did scale
economies have the opportunity to exist prior to the FTA
given the tariff in the energy situation?

Thirdly, will

the implementation of a free trade agreement, provide a
truly free trade situation between the U.S. and Canada?

The
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nature of trade within the countries themselves as a model
for free trade suggests that it won't:
One hundred and sixteen years of free trade in
manufacturing in Canada (with the exception of
provincial procurement practices) have not produced
the equality of productivity by industry across the
country within the limits that transportation costs
allow. Why, then, should we expect free trade with
the United States will change this? In short,
whether we are considering productivity
improvements, the pace of technological advance or
other aspects of meeting foreign competition, a host
of domestic traditions, customs, business pratices,
and institutions will have to be dealt with as well.
Free Trade alone is not enough. 5
Limiting the benefits of an FTA: Sunk Costs and Trade.
James Markusen considered the arguments of Wonnacot and
Wonnacot and added a consideration conspicuously absent from
their analysis, sunk costs.

It is assumed by Wonnacot and

Wonnacot, et al., that any change in trade liberalization
would result in some firms entering and possibly others
leaving the market until a new zero profit equilibrium was
.

achieved.

77

.

.

.

.

.

Further it was implicit in Wonnacot and

Wonnacot that any firm with superior technology would enter,
and by pricing at average cost, could force an existing less
efficient firm to sell its assets and exit from the*
7
75B.W. Wilkinson in John Whalley Canada-U.S. Free Trade
7 ft

'°James R. Markusen, "Canadian Gains from Trade in the
Presence of Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition," in
John Whalley, Canada-United States Free Trade (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1986).
77

'Ronald Wonnacot and Paul Wonnacot, Free Trade Between
the United States and Canada. A zero profit equilibrium is
achieved when firms engaged in production would preclude
additional firms entering production from breaking even, let
alone making a profit.
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industry.

Markusen argues that both assumptions must be

modified if a firm's investments are sunk costs, that is, if
investments are for various reasons irrecoverable or have
very little market value should the firm choose to exit from
•
78
production.

Further, Markusen argues that when costs are sunk,
existing firms have an advantage over new entrants even if
the latter have better technology or entrepreneurial
expertise.

Potential entrants know that existing firms will

price down to marginal cost before exiting, which may imply
that entry is deterred.

Sunk costs thus give first entrants

a strategic advantage and may imply positive long-run
profits for those firms, while at the same time distorting
•

•

.

.

•

efficient production associated with free trade.
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Related to Markusen's sunk costs argument, Rodrique
Trembley addressed the possibility of abrogation of a free
trade agreement with its six month termination clause and
its implications for trade behavior because of sunk costs.
He writes that short term termination notices place Canadian
industry at a distinct disadvantage and thus would limit
gains because of sunk cost considerations: "Canadian
industries cannot rationalize and specialize for a large
continental market if (the market situation) cannot change
dramatically in ... 180 days."80

It appears that potential7
*

78James R. Markusen, "Canadian Gains from Trade in the
Presence of Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition."
79 I b i d .
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gains from tariff reduction are thus limited directly to the
presence of sunk cost considerations.
Utility of the Models.

When applying the models to the

North Dakota energy sector, we have to be aware that these
models are very limited in their applicability:
Economic models are not by any means satisfactory.
But the modellers themselves are usually the first
to point out that their results are only a rough
guide and that they depend on some key background
assumptions and, of course, on the structure of the
particular model. 1
None of these models addressed the subsectors of energy
industries that resembles North Dakota's energy industries.
Thus the economic argument is difficult to settle.

We have

to be careful about interpreting the models and analyses for
North Dakota's energy sector as a result.

The available

sectoral research is sketchy at best, and much of it can be
•
QO
challenged on methodological grounds.
Nonetheless, the
information provided by these models and analyses will be
utilized with the appropriate caveats.
Equally important is the question of the applicability
of general equilibrium models to individual sectors.

As the

economies in this world become more complex, the economic
literature becomes somewhat second best because of the
-------------------- O -r-j------------------ ;------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ;-----------------------------------------

Rodnque Trembley "Adjustment Concerns during the
Transition to North American Free Trade" in Murray Smith and
Frank Stone Assessing the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
(Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy,
1987).8
1
81Peter Cornell, In Support of Trade Liberalization
OO

#

Denis Stairs, Non Economic Implications of a
Comprehensive Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in Maslove
and Winer, Knocking on the Back Door
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limitations of the models and the many conditions that are
deemed necessary to ensure welfare maximization.

Most

obviously, the models do not take into account the effects
of government intervention into the economy (which will
continue to an extent under this free trade agreement):
Because of the fact that perfect competition rarely
exists, it cannot be assumed that all marginal
social costs and benefits are equal in every segment
of the economy.83
A third drawback to the utility of the economic models
is the neglect of the models to address the prevalence of
nontariff barriers and subsidies.

A subsidy can be devised

to replicate the economic effects of a tariff.

From an

economic perspective, a subsidy acts very much like a tariff
but in a negative way.84

The subsidy thus operates to

encourage less efficient production than a free market
without such distortions would encourage.
Given the limitations of the models presented, and the
uniqueness of the North Dakota energy sector, we must next
look at North Dakota-Canada trade in energy and examine the
provisions of the FTA.

Chapter three takes this orientation

and also looks at the potential stability of the agreement
as an aid in determining its economic effects.

83Gilles Pacquet, Elegant But Not Helpful to
Navigation: Social Science Research and the Free Trade
Debate in Maslove and Winer, Knocking on the Back Door
04 .
#
Michael J. Trebilcock, Can We Become Better Losers?:
The Problem of Divesting from Declining Sectors, in Maslove
and Winer, Knocking on the Back Door

Chapter III
NORTH DAKOTA-CANADA TRADE AND THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Security of Free Trade: History of U.S.-Canada Free Trade
The idea of a free trade association between the United
,
-1
States and Canada preceded Canada's formal confederation.
i

It continued in the first session of Canadian parliament
ever held.

The result was an negotiated economic treaty

with the United States.

As the United States continued its

metamorphis from follower to hegemonic leader, it sought
additional trade pacts with Canada.
The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854.

Britain, the world's

hegemonic trade leader during this point in history, opened
up its markets to many new traders by freeing trade with all
its trading partners.2

Prior to this agreement, England

granted special trading treatment only to its colonies.
Britain had worked to free up world trade for a variety of
reasons: perhaps the most important motivation was to slow
industrial development in Europe so that England could reap
the benefits of the markets for its manufactured goods.3

■'■Canada's formal confederation was July 1, 1867.
2
.
.
David A. Lake and Jeffry A. Freiden, International
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth
(New York, St. Martins, 1987).

66

In

67
order to provide stable markets for its goods, Canada and
the United States, in a time of scarce external markets,
sought to provide a stable market by forming a free trade
area.
The reciprocity treaty provided for free trade in
agricultural and forest products; ores and metals; dairy
products; animal, fish, and kindred products; but very few
manufactured goods.

Although the list of products covered

under the treaty seems short, this was so because at the
onset of the treaty fifty-five percent of U.S. exports
entered Canada duty free as did ninety percent of Canadian
exports to the United States.4
The reciprocity treaty lasted scarcely ten years.

The

United States cancelled the treaty in 1866 after giving the
required one year notice.

A number of reasons were given

for abrogating the agreement, among them were British
preference for the confederacy during the Civil War5 and
increased Canadian duties during the life of the agreement
which violated the letter and spirit of the agreement.6

It

5Ibid. England believed that no other European
countries had the technology to compete with itself if
protective barriers were removed.
4Peter Morici. "U.S.-Canada Free Trade Discussions:
What are the Issues?" 15 American Review of Canadian
Studies: 311-323.
R
.
.
.
.
.
Anna Guthrie, "A Brief History of Canadian-American
Reciprocity," in Peter Morici, "U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Discussions."
6J.L. Granatstein, "The Issue That Will Not Go Away:
Free Trade Between Canada and the United States" Royal
Economic Commission on the Economic Union and Developmental
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has also been suggested that the agreement failed because
both Canada and the United States equated downswings in
their respective economies during portions of the life of
the agreement with the agreement's provisions.

Conversely,

after the failure of the reciprocity treaty, tariff
protections had been rationalized as the cause of growth
preceding the onset of the agreement.*
8
7
The reciprocity agreement and the current free trade
agreement are similar in that the tariff situation between
the countries was quite similar prior to the onset of the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.

If history does repeat

itself, the FTA will have a great test for survival in the
near future. The complicated nature of the trading
relationship, and the relatively volatile nature that the
economy may take, leaves the current attempt at a free
trading relationship on shakey ground at the onset of this
agreement.
Canadian Confederation (1867) to 1911.

During the late

1800s, Canada sought to establish an agreement similar to
the reciprocity agreement of 1854, but this attempt was to
include more manufactured goods.

The United States failed

to adopt such an arrangement because the trade policy of the

Prospects for Canada, May 1984:8 in Peter Morici "U.S.Canada Free Trade Discussions."
7Ibid.
8William Diebold, Jr. "The History and the Issues" in
William Diebold, Jr. ed., Bilarteralism, Multilateralism and
Canada in U.S. Trade Policy. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988.
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United States during this period was learning toward
protectionism for domestic industries.9
Protectionist sentiments declined in the United States
during the late 1880s/early 1890s as the U.S. assumed its
role as the hegemonic leader.

But just as the Americans

were ready to embark on another round of tariff reduction
measures with Canada, Canada lost its willingness to enter
into a treaty.

Canada had embarked on a nationalism policy

to protect the outflow of Canadian technology and know
how.10

Attempts to reach an agreement failed largely

because of the inability of the two parties to reach a
consensus on the form of an arrangment; Canada wanted a free
trade area while the United States wanted a customs union.11
The 1911 U.S.-Canada Agreement.

In January of 1911,

semtiment in both the United States and Canada was ripe for
a third attempt at a reciprocity agreement.

This agreement

was much more broad sweeping than the Reciprocity Treaty of
1854, however.

More agricultural and natural resource

products, as well as more manufactured goods, were included
in the agreement.12

Although both governments of the day

Q
Anna Guthrie, "A Brief History of Canadian-American
Reciprocity," in Peter Morici, "U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Discussions."
10This policy, called the National Policy, was not a
great economic success through the end of the century.
Canadian nationalism was running high and the fear of the
loss of Canadian sovereignty prevented an agreement.
11Anna Guthrie, "A Brief History of Canadian-American
Reciprocity," in Peter Morici, "U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Discussions."
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were willing to enter into an economic union, the Canadian
electorate wasn't quite so ready.

The Liberal government of

Wilfred Laurier was defeated by the Conservative party
headed by Robert Borden. This spelled an end to free trade
talks until after the two world wars.

This era was

characterized by heavy protectionist sentiment in Canada
(significant tariff increases) and the United States
(Smooth-Hawley tariffs of 1930).
Post World War II.

Following World War II, Canada ran

a significant balance of payments deficit with the United
States and this situation brought about more protectionism
in Canada in the late 1940s.

Canadians were envious of the

American gains made immediately following World War II.

The

Government of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King was
interested in becoming more closely tied to the United
States economically, so that Canada could reap the benefits
•

t

.

that the Americans were enjoying abroad.
The only bilateral trading agreement between the United
States and Canada during this period (with the exception of
the 1988 Free Trade Agreement) was the 1965 Automotive
Agreement, more commonly referred to as the Auto Pact.
agreement was by no means a free trade agreement.

This

Instead,

the Auto Pact was an agreement to prevent a rash of Canadian
tariffs from distorting trade in automobiles between the two1
3
1^Peter Morici, "U.S.-Canada Free Trade Discussions."
13William Diebold, Jr. "The History and the Issues,"
in William Diebold, Jr., Bilateralism. Multiateralism and
Canada in U.S. Trade Policy.
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countries.

Although the Auto Pact eliminated tariffs on

automobiles and automobile parts manufactured in the two
countries, the agreement also contained safeguards to Canada
requiring U.S. automakers to undertake levels of production
in Canada related to the volume of sales there.

This

agreement illustrates the willingness of Canada to make
concessions as well as its unwillingness to enter into full
blown free trade.

The Auto Pact set the tone for Canadian

tolerance of foreign investment on its soil.14
(
Free Trade Today. One theme arises out of the
discussion of the past attempts at liberalized trade between
the United States and Canada: the U.S., in its role as the
hegemonic leader of the trading world, showed its desire to
free trade with its most important trading partner.

Canada

has always been hesitant to enter a reciprocity agreement.
For a second time in the trading history of the United
States and Canada, a free trade agreement will be
implemented, at least for the time being.

The stability of

the agreement will likely be a function of the political and
economic stability in the two countries, if history is to
repeat itself.
It appears likely that Canada may again assume its
historical role as the nation that is scared of free trade.
This hesitancy on the part of Canada is a major factor in
making the agreement inherently unstable.

The FTA will

probably last at least the next four years until the next
14Peter Morici, "U.S.-Canada Free Trade Discussions."
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Canadian general election.

But with a recession predicted

to sink in within one to two years in Canada15, the Canadian
electorate will look to rationalize a cause of this
downswing in the economy as has been Canada's position since
World War II.

Historically, protectionism became greatest

when the economy experienced a downswing.

Most certainly

the FTA will be looked upon and blamed as the culprit of the
recession.

For instance, just four days after the November

21st, 1988 Canadian general election, Gillete of Canada, a
<
major toiletries manufacturer, announced that its Montreal
(Quebec) plant would be closed down.

Immediately the

opposition parties in the Canadian Parliament blamed this
plant closing on the FTA.

What the Canadian media (and

opposition parliamentarians) failed to report was the
closure of the Minneapolis (Minnesota) Gillette plant that
same day.

Plant closures will continue to be blamed on the

FTA, whether or not the FTA is actually to blame.

The FTA

will be blamed in both countries for plant closures and
subsequent loss of jobs that accompany a recession.

The

irony is that the Government of Canada and the Canadian
electorate have historically acted in opposite directions at
the onset of a recession.

When economic times get tough,

the Canadian government has historically tried to improve
access to the American market.

Conversely, the Canadian

electorate's position has been opposite to its government's
1R
.
The Economic Council of Canada in Canada has
predicted little or no growth in the Canadian economy by the
end of 1990.
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orientations.

The American government has tended to

practice protectionism in its trade policies in times of
economic downswing.16
One further comment must be made; the effects of the
agreement will likely be felt very far into the future
because of the agreement's long implementation schedule.17
Looking at the EEC for guidance, there is little doubt that
a free trade area does take a great deal of time to develop.
Change will take time, but its the rocky road of change that
i
the agreement will encounter. Changing the purchasing
habits of consumers will be difficult.

Economic decisions

on the part of manufacturers will likely be based on
perceived stability of the agreement.

At least in the short

run, Canadians will be swayed by the opposition parties in
Canada that the FTA has done nothing positive for Canada,
and the deal will likely be abolished in Canada before its
implementation period is complete (with the required six
months notice).
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement; Provisions
This section provides an examination of the provisions
of the current free trade agreement.

The purpose of this

16Earl H. Fry, "Trends in Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Discussions: 1911-1986" in A.R. Riggs and Tom Velk, eds.
Canadian-American Free Trade: Historical. Political and
Economic Dimensions Halifax: Institute for Research on
Public Policy, 1987).
17

Allan M. Maslove and Stanley L. Winer, Knocking on
the Back Door: Canadian Perspectives on the Political
Economy of Freer Trade with the United States (Halifax: The
Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987).
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examination is to set an adequate background to assess the
impact of the FTA on North Dakota's energy sector, thus
setting the background for chapter four.

Provisions of the

agreement that do not apply to North Dakota's energy sector,
or are likely to have no effect on trade in energy, are
included to a very limited degree in Appendix B.
On January 2, 1988, United States' President, Ronald
Reagan, and Canada's Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney,
separately signed what has been descibed as the largest and
most important trade agreement ever undertaken by two
countries, covering more trade and trade-related issues than
any previous agreement. °

The U.S.-Canada Free Trade

Agreement (FTA) proposes to break new ground to establish a
trading arrangement that is unique between two independent
countries.

This agreement allows for freer trade, not

totally free trade;

not all goods or services that the two

countries produce are included in the provisions of this
agreement.

Of the areas covered in the FTA, tariff and non

tariff barriers are eliminated subject to a four-tiered
tariff elimination schedule.
The FTA is an agreement on trade and trade-related
issues negotiated so as to be consistent with the terms and
limitations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).
GATT.

The FTA builds on the general framework of the

Although the FTA is an attempt to place importance on*

TftExternal Affairs Canada, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement [Ottawa, Ont.]: External Affairs Canada, 1987.
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American-Canadian bilateral trade,

it is not an attempt to

isolate the United States and Canada from the rest of the
trading world.

As such, the United States and Canada have

restated a mutual commitment to maintain fair trade
practices throughout the world.

Through a free trade

agreement, the United States and Canada have also expressed
a desire to preserve and strengthen the largest trading
relationship between two countries.20

The FTA sets a new

standard for trade agreements concluded under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).21

The two countries

have accepted each other as preferred trading partners in a
more sweeping agreement than what was established in the
European Economic Community.222
3
The FTA includes provisions that, in the view of the
two participating nations, augment the GATT.

For instance,

the GATT has been particularly weak in its language dealing
.

.

.

.

.

.

p "5

with subsidies, dumping and countervailing measures. J

The

1Q . The GATT provides
•
for free trade areas and customs
unions that would remain consistent with the GATT so long as
other members of the GATT are treated equally outside of the
chosen method of trade liberalization.
pn

,

. The United States and Canada traded goods and
services valued at $152,980,000,000 U.S. in 1986.
21External Affairs Canada, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: Synopsis [Ottawa, Ont.]: External Affairs Canada,
1987.
pp

The other trading partners of the United States and
Canada will continue to receive the same treatment under
GATT as was the case before the FTA.
23External Affairs Canada, The Canada-US Free Trade
Agreement. A countervailing measure is a tariff application
by country "A" on a commodity of country "B" that has been
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FTA is designed to be flexible to deal with unique
situations that may arise in which the agreement itself may
not have directly addressed.

In order to deal with trade

disputes between the parties to the agreement, and to avoid
much of the bickering that occurs when GATT members try to
settle a dispute,

a bi-national judicial body will be

formed to deal with disputes arising under the FTA.
The FTA provides for the liberalization of trade in
most areas of the United States' and Canada's economies,
i

which in the long run will effect a more formal integration
of the two countries' economies.24

Because these countries

are presently very much integrated, there probably won't be
a radical adjustment necessary by either party to implement
the agreement.

The provisions of the FTA pertaining to

energy are summarized below.
Energy.

The FTA prohibits import and export

restrictions on energy goods, including minimum export
prices.

Any export quotas used to enforce short supply or

conservation measures must ensure that the second party
"dumped" on country "A's" market at less than the cost of
production. Country "A" has taken steps to protect its own
producers because the subsidies have made the commodity of
country "B" look more efficiently produced, and have priced
country "A's" producers out of the market as a result.
24Ronald Wannacot and Paul Wannacot, Free Trade Between
the United States and Canada: The Potential Economic Effects
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). Wannacot and
Wannacot argue that there will be a harmonization of
economies with a broadsweeping free trade arrangement. The
American and Canadian economies are already largely
integrated as a result of the trade patterns preceding the
FTA. However, with the financial provisions of the
agreement (including investment) the two economies will
likely see greater economic integration.
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receives a proportionate share of energy goods received
before the shortage occurred.
The FTA establishes the following specific rules as to
the trade of energy between the two countries:
1. Recognition of the other country's respective rights
under the GATT, including no inconsistency with the
Agreement on an International Energy Program (IEP).
2. Each country must interpret the GATT to prohibit
minimum price requirements; those requirements are
permitted only in the enforcement of countervailing
and antidumping orders and undertakings.
3. A tax may be levied on export energy provided
that an equal tax be levied and maintained on
domestic energy.
4. In the event of an energy shortage, the exporting
territory must continue to provide energy to the
other territory proportionate to the amount supplied
before the shortage.
5. Both parties agree to allow existing or future
incentives (subsidies) for oil and gas exploration
in order to maintain reserve bases. Subsidies may
not actually extend to the actual production of oil
and gas, however.
6. Investment opportunities will become available for
each country in the other country's territory
without discrimination.25
The FTA also provides for the continued allowance of
government monopolies such as provincially owned electricity
companies in Canada, or in the case of the U.S. federally
controlled Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).

It is expected

that long-term arrangements will be negotiated to ensure the
development of electricity trade in a mutually beneficial
manner consistent with the objectives and principles of the

25A11 of these provisions are included in Article 9 of
the FTA.
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FTA.

The absence of such arrangements makes it more

difficult to determine the exporting behavior of the each
party's energy producers.

Absent such an arrangement, the

writer has to assume that this type of arrangement will not
be included in any future amendment, due to the lack of
indication as to the possible content of such an
arrangement.
Border Measures.

Currently, most trade between the

United States and Canada is free.

Eighty percent of

Canadian exports flow into the U.S. duty free, while sixtyfive percent of U.S. exports flow into Canada duty free.
The average Canadian duty on U.S. dutiable exports is
between nine and ten percent, while the average U.S. duty
on Canadian dutiable exports averages four to five
percent.2
27
6

The key to any true free trade agreement is the

elimination of virtually all tariffs on trade between the
parties to such an agreement.

American and Canadian tariffs

on the goods of third world countries will remain unchanged
and under each country's control regardless of the
provisions of the current agreement.

In the elimination of

many of the existing tariffs between the U.S. and Canada,
the FTA provides for a four-tier tariff schedule:

26External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement.
o7
.
Arlene Wilson, Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, January 1988):
CRS-7.

79
1. industries ready to compete now will see an elimination
of all tariff and non-tariff barriers on January 1,
1989 (Schedule A).
2. a five year equal stage reduction in tariff and non
tariff barriers would occur beginning on January 1,
1989, and ending in 1994 (Schedule B).
3. a ten year equal stage reduction in tariff and non
tariff barriers would occur beginning on January 1,
1989, and ending in 1998 (Schedule C).
4. a continuation of the current situation in which there
are no tariffs or non-tariff barriers placed on goods
in this category (Schedule D).
North Dakota's unprocessed energy and electricity fall into
the fourth category because there are currently no tariffs
levied on energy as defined by this study.
In addition to tariff reduction, customs user fees
currently employed by the United States will be eliminated
subject to Article 403 of the FTA.28

Duty drawbacks and

duty remissions and waivers must also be eliminated subject
to a reduction schedule ending on January 1, 1994.

These

measures help to ensure that rule of origin provisions
discussed in the following section aren't manipulated to the
detriment of one of the parties.

28Customs user fees are special fees charged to the
importer of goods (a handling charge by customs) that are
free of duty, thus constituting a barrier to trade.
^ D u t y drawbacks, waivers, and remissions are
techniques used to avoid duties on articles when articles
are imported into one of the countries for manufacturing and
the finished product is exported to another country. Duties
are actually paid upon import, but are subsequently refunded
on export.
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The FTA also deals with situations in which shortages
of supply occur:
[E]xport restrictions for such purposes (shortage of
supply) may not reduce the proportion of the good
exported to the other country relative to the total
supply of the good compared to the proportion exported
prior to the imposition of the restriction. 0
The rationale for this protection is that given the
integration and specialization expected from this
initiative, the parties not only share in the benefits that
accrue from this agreement; each country must also share in
(
the shortfalls of supply and production. This provision of
the agreement is particularly relevant to the trade in
energy.

One country cannot cut off supply to the other in

times of shortage; energy must be shared in the same
proportion to the foreign consumer enjoyed before the
shortage.

The average for the preceding thirty-six month

period is the determinant of the proportion to be shared.
Rules of Origin.

Only goods produced in Canada, the

United States, or in both Canada and the United States
qualify for the tariff reductions in this agreement.
Explicit in the FTA is the prohibition of other countries
receiving the benefits of this agreement.

This is to

prevent multi-national corporations from gaining access to
the free trade zone by importing goods through an American
or Canadian sudsidiary and selling said goods as goods
manufactured in the free trade area.

Both countries will

30External Affairs Canada, Canada- U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: Article 409.
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continue to apply their existing tariffs to imports from
other countries.
This section of the FTA describes content law on goods
partially manufactured in the U.S. or Canada, whether using
raw materials from other countries or partially manufactured
in either country.

Manufactured goods sold in either the

U.S. or Canada would have to incorporate a significant
portion of the manufacturing in one or both of the
countries.

The agreement implies that in most cases, fifty
(.
percent of value added must occur in either or both
countries, although the proportion of minimum value added in
the free trade area varies by product.
Trade in energy is mostly unaffected by this provision.
Energy imported into the United States and Canada from both
inside and outside the borders of the agreement generally
arrives in an unprocessed form with the exception of
electricity.

Even with electricity there is little danger

of foreign processing intruding on the American or Canadian
markets disguised as American or Canadian electricity
because of the geographic limitations of the free trade
area.
Quotas.

Most export and import quotas are disallowed

unless specifically allowed by the GATT or grandfathered by
the FTA.

Allowable quotas apply to the auto industry and
•
.
the poultry industry
for the life
of the agreement. ^? One1
2
3
31Ibid.
32 Ibid.
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of the parties may maintain or introduce quotas for other
products given certain production situations. J

Quotas are

explicitly disallowed for the regulation of trade in energy.
As previously mentioned, shortage of supply does not
constitute an acceptable situation for an export quota on
energy and energy products.
National Treatment.

The FTA reaffirms the GATT

principle preventing discrimination against imported goods.
Goods from the other party may be treated only in the same
manner of treatment afforded to its domestic goods of the
same nature.

This protection prevents replacement of

external measures (tariffs) with internal measures
(nontariff barriers) favoring domestic products once goods
of one party are in the other's market.3
34*
3

This section is

particularly important in the trade of energy.

It ensures

that trade in energy will not be subject to discriminatory
practices disguised as local public policy decisions in the
interest of local producers.
Technical Barriers.

The use of technical standards as

trade barriers has been strictly prohibited by the FTA.

In

the past, the United States and Canada have used these

33For example, subsidies paid to U.S. wheat producers
are much higher than those paid to Canadian farmers. Canada
may establish quotas until sudsidy levels become equal.
34External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement.
An important exception to this rule is state and
local government procurement policies. This issue is
discussed later in this chapter.
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barriers on non-dutiable goods as an unnecessary obstable to
trade, thus constituting a nontariff barrier.36

In order to

ensure that this type of nontariff barrier is eliminated,
the FTA provides for a harmonization of technical standards.
In order to facilitate this harmonization the two countries
will implement national treatment of testing labs and
certification bodies.

The agreement provides for certain

exemptions from product standards:
1. measures of protection through technical standards
falling under the juristiction of a state or province.
2. measures or procedures that can be demonstrated to
achieve a legitimate domestic objective (an objective
whose purpose is to protect health, safety, essential
security, the environment, or consumer interests.
3. measures or procedures that do not operate to exclude
goods of the other party that meet that legitimate
domestic objective. 7
The harmonization of technical standards in the
generation of electicity has become a particularly
contentious issue.

In the United States, juristiction over

the sulfur dioxide emissions of thermal-electricity
generating plants falls within the domain of the federal
government.

As such, Washington maintains a national

standard of sulfur dioxide emissions regardless of the total
emmission load introduced in an individual geographical

36An example of this practice was the U.S.'s ban of
Canadian pork because Canadian producers used a certain
anti-biotic banned in the U.S., although prior to the
controversy the U.S. officials were well aware that Canadian
hog producers used the banned substance.
37External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: Articles 601, 603 and 609.
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area.

North Dakota falls under the same per-plant emmission

standards as large industrial states such as Michigan.
There is no flexibility in these standards to take into
account that North Dakota as a whole emits much less S02
that an industrial state, relative to what the air can hold
in that particular area.
In contrast to the nation-wide restrictions placed on
American sulfur dioxide emissions, the Canadian government
delegates control over emissions to its provinces.

Thus

arises the question of achieving harmonized emmission
standards in electricity production as standards falling
under the juristiction of a state or province are exempt
from the harmonization of technical standards provided in
the agreement.

The American regulation which requires

installation of an air scrubber on coal fired plants to
reduce S02 emmissions, creates a burden not necessarily
shared by the Canadian coal fired producers.

This

pollution-control device requirement intuitively places
North Dakota producers at a cost disadvantage, all other
factors being equal.

If Canadian provinces continue to have

juristiction over this form of pollution control, the issue
falls outside of the juristiction of the agreement.

North

Dakota producers thus will always find themselves at a
potential cost disadvantage in coal-fired electricity
generation.

The impact of this provision is somewhat
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diminished due to the nature of electricity production in
•

•

.

Manitoba, North Dakota's main energy competitor.
Emergency Action.

OO

Temporary import restrictions to

protect domestic industries harmed by imports from the other
country may be allowed, but only in certain circumstances.
The FTA will allow such emergency actions only in special
cases, and only during the tariff reduction period.

No such

emergency action will be allowed after January 1, 1998.
In granting special restrictions, the United States and
Canada have attempted to smooth out the adjustment to a free
trade zone.

Some industries may be ready to compete only

after a certain adjustment period; the tariff reduction
schedule may in fact be too short for adjustment in those
areas.

If one of the parties chooses to envoke emergency

action, it is understood that the other country will be
allowed a special reciprocal exemption, to even out the
effects of discrimination and to prevent abuses of the
emergency action provisions during the tariff reduction
period:
The provisions of this chapter are important in
establishing a more predictable climate for investors in
both countries to take advantage of the agreement,
secure in the knowledge that their access to the other
market will not be impaired by capricious action
stemming from domestic complaints.3
39
8

38Almost all of Manitoba's electricity generation is
hydro-driven, which is not an issue of technical standards
vis-a-vis sulfur dioxide emissions. Although Manitoba does
have a coal-fired plant near Winnipeg, its purpose is not to
constantly generate electricity, rather it is to provide
generating capacity when water levels are low in Manitoba.
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Unprocessed energy and electricity is set to compete now;
there is no indication that this section could be used to
the advantage of American or Canadian energy industries.
Government Procurement.

Each year the governments of

the United States and Canada purchase billions of dollars in
goods and services.40

Before the FTA, it was standard

practice for each government to discriminate against the
goods of other countries, choosing instead to patronize
domestic producers and service providers.
t

.

Before the FTA,

.

only federal contracts exceeding $171,000 could be bid on by
foreign parties, and only in certain government departments.
The FTA allows providers of goods or services to bid for
federal government contracts in the free trade area in most
government departments where the contract amount exceeds
$25,000.
The United States will gain access to twenty-two
Canadian government departments (excluding the departments
of Transport, Communication, and Fisheries and Oceans), as
well as ten agencies.

Canada will gain access to most U.S.

government departments (excluding the Departments of Energy
and Transport), forty government agencies, NASA and the
General Services Commission.

The range of departments

covered in the agreement is likely to expand as the two
parties continue negotiation in this area.

These

J^External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement.
40External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement.
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negotiations must be concluded no later than one year after
the conclusion of the current round of the GATT
negotiations.
As far as the procurement policies of the North Dakota
state government, there is no mandated change in disallowing
discriminatory procurement policies at the state level.

If

the University of North Dakota (as a state institution)
chooses to buy North Dakota coal even where costs may exceed
foreign coal, the state regulation would be allowed to
stand.

Only federal procurement policies will be under the

scrutiny of this deal.
It should be clear from the shear size difference in
government spending between the United States and Canada
that Canadian manufactures and service providers have the
greater potential to gain.

But in fact, given that there is

a great number of American subsidiaries operating in Canada,
the size of this gain will likely be smaller.

There is

likely to be an exodus of certain Canadian subsidiaries of
American companies back to the United States if the
agreement takes hold.41
Investment.

The FTA provides for equal treatment of

the establishment of new businesses only.

American and

Canadian investors must be treated in an equal manner as
domestic investors. The exceptions to this are:

41John Whalley, Canada-U.S. Free Trade (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1986).
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1) regulation that doesn't serve as a barrier to trade (e.g.
laws governing competition); 2) Canadian regulation in the
oil, gas, and uranium sectors; and 3) Canada's right to
review direct acquisition of firms in Canada by U.S.
investors which will be retained with some restrictions.
Presently, the Canadian government has the right to review
all American acquisitions of Canadian business.

By 1992

only one-quarter of all total non-financial assets would be
reviewable (the company would have to worth more than $150
million at that time).
One of the parties may decide that nationalization of a
certain industry is in the public interest. If such
nationalization was to take place, the interests being
expropriated would be entitled to due process of law, and
would be entitled to a fair market value.42

For example,

Canada under the government of Pierre Trudeau nationalized
the petroleum industry in the 1970s.

The present Canadian

government could choose to follow the same action, but such
a decision would upset the spirit of the agreement, and
would probably be seen as a direct blow to the attempt at
trade liberalization.
General Dispute Settlement.

The FTA provides for

methods and timetables for dispute settlement with the
desire that the parties arrive at a mutually satisfactory
solution.

A United States-Canada Trade Commission is

42External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: Section 1605.
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created for the resolution of conflicts that arise.

The

Commission will consist of a panel of two Americans, two
Canadians, and one other person agreeable to the two
parties.

If the commission fails to provide a satisfactory

settlement, binding arbitration must be undertaken to settle
the dispute.43
Anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases are dealt
with in a different way than the above dispute mechanism.
Each party retains the right to apply its anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws to goods imported from the
territory of the other party.

A bi-national panel will be

chosen to adjudicate disputes regarding each others' anti
dumping laws.

In addition, the two parties will engage in

negotiations governing subsidies and dumping in order to
develop mutually advantageous rules governing such
matters.44
Amendment and Termination.

The agreement may be

amended by bilateral action of the parties.

As mentioned

earlier, there is an attempt to define what constitutes
subsidies.

A major pitfall with the agreement is the

43Each country will have continued access to its own
body to determine whether its countervailing duties were
justified. If the other party disputes the findings as an
incorrect application of the provisions of the FTA, it may
appeal to a panel. The panel is formed with each country
choosing two members and a fifth member chosen jointly.
Each country may seek a review of an anti-dumping or
countervailing duty determination by that panel. This panel
will have binding powers on both parties.
44External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement.
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failure of the two countries to agree upon the question of
subsidies, and what constitutes a subsidy.

There are to be

negotiations in the next five to seven years to determine
what a sudsidy is.

Both energy and especially agriculture

utilize sudsidies.

The lack of definition at this time

makes the task of predicting the impact of the agreement on
each industry that much more difficult, given this great
unknown variable.
North Dakota energy producers, and other economic
sectors in North Dakota for that matter, will continue to
wonder whether the publically controlled electricity
corporations in Manitoba are receiving operating subsidies.
The determination of what constitutes a subsidy in this
situation will be very difficult.

Although there is a

dispute settlement mechanism in the FTA, there has to be
some type of standard for the tribunal to apply to energy
subsidy questions.

Simply interpreting the intentions of

the writers of this document versus an agreement on what
constitutes a subsidy, subjects the parties to a more
arbitrary tribunal determination.
A major limiting force of this present agreement is its
termination clause; either of the parties may terminate this
agreement under six months notice to the other party.

The

threat of terminating the agreement with such a short
notification period will have the effect of distorting
economic decisions, contradicting the agreement's goal to
prevent economic distortions.

Firms that trade in capital
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intensive goods, which energy certainly fits this
description, will be reluctant in tying up capital with the
threat of cancellation of the agreement.45

Hesitancy on the

part of investors would certainly impair some of the
predicted positive results of the agreement.
The FTA by no means is a perfect agreement; the two
countries already acknowledge this.

In no way can the

negotiators of the two countries fully know the impacts of
the provisions. ■As in the case with any negotiated pact
there had to be give and take; some sectors of the American
economy will lose, some will win.

The United States hopes

that there will be a general gain in aggregate welfare from
the implementation of the agreement.

Whether North Dakota

energy producers will win or a lose is the topic of chapter
four, but the potential stability of the agreement is an
important factor in its effect on the economies of both
countries.

The next section examines the North Dakota-

Canada trading relationship to determine patterns of trade
and accompanying rationality.
North Dakota-Canada Trade
Historically, North Dakota has not been a major
exporter to Canada by any means.

Only 1.5% of North

Dakota's gross state product (GSP) is exported to Canada
which is well below the U.S. national average of 4.4%.

On

the other hand Canada exports slightly more than twice as
A R

,

,

,

,

A further discussion of sunk costs is included in
chapter four.

92
much to North Dakota as it imports.

This North Dakota-

Canada trading relationship mirrors the relative
unimportance of the Canadian market to American producers,
and conversely the importance of the American market to
Canadian producers.46

To illustrate the importance of this

point, a comparison of exports to gross national product
(GNP) is in order.

Table 2.1 makes this comparison.

The

total trade between the United States and Canada in 1986
exceeded $150 billion (U.S.).

Table 3.1

GNP

Countrv
U.S.

United States and Canada Trade and Gross National
Product (GNP) (billion U.S. dollars), 1985

Value of
total exports

Value of
exports to
each other

3,947

356.560

171.815

346

100.794

81.425

Canada

% of GNP
exported to
each other
4.4
23.5

Source: Canada's Trade Statistics. 2nd ed. Ottawa: Minister
of Supply and Services Canada, December 1987.

A major reason for North Dakota's lack of trade with
Canada is the production of similar products on both sides
of the border, e.g. agricultural products.

North Dakotan

and Canadian producers compete for external markets in many
------

A 'fc

.'

"'

Canada has a small domestic market; in order to
achieve economies of scale it must agressively pursue
international trade. North Dakota, on the other hand, has a
much greater domestic market and directs its efforts to
supplying that market given its factor endowments and
economic limitations, versus agressively seeking trade with
Canada.
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areas.

For example, as North Dakota's economy has grown

over its one hundred year history it has competed directly
with Canadian agricultural producers. Trade between the U.S.
and Canada in any great proportion usually occurred only
where an agricultural product was produced by only one of
these parties.47*
Where production is similar, competition for foreign
markets has been the focus of trade efforts.

To market its

supply of wheat,’the United States and Canada have competed
against each other (and most recently the EEC, Australia and
Brazil) for control of the lucrative Soviet market.
Although in the North Dakota-Canada trading relationship
there certainly is duplication,

(e.g. electricity and

processed petroleum products), for the most part, North
Dakota-Canada trade has augmented North Dakota's economic
activity.

Trade in most products has come about to fill a

void on either side of the border.
•

•

•

•

This has caused some

specialization in North Dakota's economy.

A O

Although there are not extremely detailed statistics on
trade between North Dakota and Canada by product, Statistics

47For instance corn is produced in North Dakota, the
provinces in proximity to North Dakota engage in very
limited corn production. In 1986 North Dakota exported $5.3
million (Canadian $) or $4.08 million (U.S.) worth of corn
to Canada.
HOScot A. Stradley, A Staple Perspective on Economic
Development in North Dakota (University of North Dakota:
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, May 1981). As
Stradley has argued, North Dakota's economy has been, and
continues to be driven by, its factor endowments: its
fertile land and its resource base.
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Canada and the United States Department of Commerce
publishes estimates of the leading exports and imports in
the North Dakota-Canada trading relationship.49

Where more

precise detail on trade by product cannot be ascertained by
Statistics Canada, it has created the category "other
trade."

The category "other trade" encompasses about one-

third of trade between North Dakota and Canada.

This lack

of more descriptive data does place limitations on the
making of generalizations for this study.

Nevertheless,

observations on the nature of North Dakota-Canada trade will
be made given these limitations.
What the statistics do tell us is that North Dakota is
an importer of electricity and processed petroleum products
demonstrating that there is some trade in energy.

As there

is some trade in energy, we must examine the nature of this
trade and its adherence to the principle of economic
efficiency as well as North Dakota's production behavior
based on factor endowments and comparative advantage.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 profile North Dakota-Canada trade by
major commodity group.

49For example see The North Dakota-Canada Trading
Relationship (Washington: United States Department of
Commerce, International Trade Administration, February 19,
1988) and various Canadian trade statistics reports
including Canada-U.S. Trade by State of Destination (Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, December 1988).
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Table 3.2

North Dakota Exports to Canada, 1986
(in Canadian Dollars)3

Corn

$

5,300,000

Front-end Loaders

12,300,000

New Tractors

21,900,000

Reapers,Threshers, Combines

13,200,000

Soil Preparation, Fertilizing,
and Seeding Equipment

9,300,000

Other Ag machinery

9,300,000

Other Motor Vehicles

28,400,000

Fur/Skins

14,900,000

Inorganic Chemicals
Other Trade*3
Total

5,600,000
81.000.000
$202,700,000

a . Because these trade statisitcs are quoted in Canadian
dollars, all other comparisons of statistics quoted in
American dollars will be given a Canadian dollar equivalency
in parenthesis using an exchange rate of $1 U.S. = $ 1.31
Canadian and $1 Canadian = $0.7635 American (an approximate
exchange rate for 1986).
k. Although the category "other trade" accounts for a
significant proportion of the trade figures, the shear
number of categories comprising this figure made a more
precise description of North Dakota-Canada trade less
manageable for Statistics Canada.
Source: Canada-U.S. Trade bv State of Destination.
Statistics Canada, December 1988).

(Ottawa:
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Table 3.3

North Dakota Imports From Canada, 1986
(in Canadian Dollars)3

Oil and Coal Products

$ 75,300,000

Electricity

22,000,000

Fertilizer

78,700,000

Inorganic Chemicals

42,200,000

Live Amimals

10,400,000

Motor Vehicle Parts

52,200,000

Newsprint

10,500,000

Soil Preparation and
Seeding Equipment

10,500,000

Other Equipment

20,400,000

Other Equipment and Tools

11,000,000

Other Trade*3
Total

103.600.000
$431,700,000

a . Because these trade statisitcs are quoted in Canadian
dollars, all other comparisons of statistics quoted in
American dollars will be given a Canadian dollar equivalency
in parenthesis using an exchange rate of $1 U.S. = $ 1.31
Canadian and $1 Canadian = $0.7635 American (an approximate
exchange rate for 1986).
b . Although the category "other trade" accounts for a
significant proportion of the trade figures, the shear
number of categories comprising this figure made a more
precise description of North Dakota-Canada trade less
manageable for Statistics Canada.
Source: Canada-U.S. Trade by State of Destination. (Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, December 1988).

With the current limitations and provisions of the FTA
in mind, the fourth chapter provides an examination of the

effects of the FTA on North Dakota’s energy sector for the
remainder of this century.

CHAPTER IV
NORTH DAKOTA ENERGY AND THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
With few exceptions1, energy has become an item very
much taken for granted since the industrial revolution.
f
Energy has become so much a part of our daily lives that few
people wonder whether adequate and affordable supplies will
continue to be available.

Well developed industrial

economies, such as the American and Canadian economies, rely
heavily on large amounts of energy to process goods into
products headed for both domestic and international markets.
One of the spin-off effects of this industrialization has
been the creation of employment for a country's populus.
Prior to the oil shortages of the 1970's caused by the Arab
oil embargos, not much debate has been given to establishing
a stable supply of energy at a reasonable price, an
essential priority of American economic trade policy.

The

embargos, however, have at least alerted the policymakers of
the United States for the need to secure energy supplies for
America's future.

The energy provisions of the FTA were

negotiated so as to work toward this goal.

1For example the Arab oil embargos of the 1970s.
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The United States and Canada, on average, currently
trade over ten billion dollars per year in energy and energy
products each year.*
3

This energy trading relationship has

been mostly stable with the exception of the implementation
of Canada's National Energy Program of the late 1970s.4

For

the most part North Dakota's small energy trading
relationship with Canada has been stable and harmonious
until recently.

Recent pressures have mounted to put that

relationship on less stable ground.56 In 1986, North
Dakota's two way trade with Canada was $456.5 million,

of

this trade, we can say for sure that $72.3 million was in
the trade of energy and energy products.
As the United States takes steps to ensure a stable
supple of energy, it has sought to augment its domestic
^U.S. Department of Commerce. The U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement [Washington, D.C.j: U.S. Department of
Commerce, December 1987.
3Arlene Wilson, Canada-U.S Free Trade Agreement
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, Economics
Division, February 8, 1988).
4The National Energy Program was implemented as a means
of limiting foreign ownership of Canadian energy production.
The program's philosophy was that Canada would be more
secure if its energy resources were controlled internally.
5For instance during Governor Allen Olsen's tenure, it
was revealed that the University of North Dakota was
purchasing Canadian coal for its steam plant. The North
Dakota Legislature then enacted legislation to effect a
government procurement policy. North Dakota products are to
receive preferential treatment by institutions of the
government of North Dakota.
6U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration, Office of Canada, The North Dakota-Canada
Trading Relationship [Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of
Commerce, International Trade Administration, Office of
Canada, 19 February 1988.
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production.

For North Dakota, energy is not just an average

industry, it's a determinant of the state's economic
viability.

The question that has to be addressed from the

point of view of North Dakota's energy producers is how will
the potential for injection of foreign energy into the
United States impact on North Dakota's energy sector?
Bearing the preceding question in mind, this chapter will
examine the impacts that the FTA will have on North Dakota's
energy sector.

In order to assess the impact the current

trading situation is examined where data is available and
appropriate, and projections are made as to what the future
holds for North Dakota energy producers and consumers under
the FTA.

The sub-sectors to be examined are petroleum,

natural gas, coal, and electricity.

The raw, unprocessed

energy resources are examined because these are key to the
energy sector in the state; the processing of raw energy
resources is minor in the state with the exception of
electricity generation.

All of the energy subsectors

examined will continue to receive protection from tariffs
imposed by the other party while under the terms of the FTA.
Because of the difficulty in quantifying some of the data
and the unavailability of other data, a full cost-benefit
analysis is not attempted here.

An examination of the pro's

and con's of the FTA is instead undertaken.
General Assumptions used in the Analysis
It is assumed that Manitoba and Saskatchewan are to be
North Dakota's only direct electricity competitors.

This
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assumption is made with the rationale that North Dakota's
trading area with Canada in electricity would continue to be
with these two Canadian provinces, as is the current trading
situation.

The building of transmission lines to receive

foreign electricity over distances further than these two
provinces would create a regional barrier to staying
competitive with Manitoba and Saskatchewan electricity.7
North Dakota's only competition for the lignitic coal
it mines and utilizes in the generation of electricity (89.4
percent of North Dakota domestic generation is by coal-fired
steam) is Saskatchewan, one of only two Canadian provinces
that mines lignitic coal.

The other province that mines

lignitic coal is New Brunswick.

New Brunswick lignite is

not considered to be competitive with Saskatchewan and North
Dakota because of the distances to market as well as the
difference in mining techniques employed.

New Brunswick

mines much of its coal underground which proves to be more
costly than North Dakota and Saskatchewan's surface mining
techniques.
Potential regional petroleum competition is found in
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba as each engages in crude
oil extraction.

However, for the purposes of this study,

Manitoba is not included as a competitor with North Dakota
because of the very minute amount that is extracted in
Manitoba each year.

Manitoba currently exports no oil to

'Ron Kirby, Vice President for Development, Manitoba
Hydro, interview by author, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 27 April
1988 .
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the United States; all of the oil extracted is transported
•
•
•
•
to Ontario
where it
is
refined
and consumed. ft

Alberta and Saskatchewan are assumed to be North
Dakota's main competitors for its gas markets.

Although

Saskatchewan currently trades no natural gas with North
Dakota, it has the potential to trade in natural gas.
Alberta, the largest natural gas producing province in
Canada, currently exports a large amount to the United
States.

Manitoba is not included in the natural gas

analysis as it produces no natural gas.
Because there is no available information about the
possible impacts the FTA will have on North Dakota energy,
and the writer is by no means an expert on North Dakota
energy and energy policy, the basic approach to discovering
the impacts of the FTA is to examine the current
relationship in the trade of energy between North Dakota and
Canada, and use the opinions of energy industry leaders
about the expected impacts of the FTA.8
9

Therefore, the

8Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, The Crude
Petroleum and Natural Gas Industry 1986 [Ottawa, Ont.]:
Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, 1987.
9The following industry leaders' opinions were utilized
for the analysis: Bob Graveline, Associate Director of the
North Dakota Industrial Commission, Oil and Gas Division; A.
Bryan Ransom, President of Manitoba Hydro, and Ron Kirby,
Vice President for Development, Manitoba Hydro; Bob
Reinstein, Trade Specialist in energy of the U.S.
International Trade Administration; and Joe Mercier,
president of Universal Explorations Ltd., a major natural
gas exporter to the United States. Numerous other energy
industry officials were contacted, but did not have an
opinion on the free trade agreement for various reasons,
e.g. they hadn't had the time to read the agreement and
conduct a policy analysis on its provisions.
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writer has made the assumption that these opinions were made
honestly, to the best of the industry leaders' knowledge on
how the markets in each respective sub-sector of energy
operate.
The final assumtion made for the analysis is that the
energy technologies currently used in the state will remain
as they are today.

No newly developed technology, or

technology not currently in use in the state will be
considered.

In the area of electricity, which has the most

potential for a change in technology (e.g. nuclear power
plants), change in electricity generation technology is
unlikely given the unattractiveness of other technologies
versus the relatively cheap lignitic coal that is plentiful
and easily accessible in North Dakota.
Subsidies.

In order to make a free trade agreement a

truly fair trade agreement, there has to be a mechanism to
deal with subsidies.

The FTA has not instituted a mechanism

to deal with subsidies in the production of energy. Speaking
on the Canadian Television Network's public affairs program
Question Period, then U.S. Trade Ambassador Clayton Yeutter
said that a program to deal with subsidy questions will be
negotiated so that American and Canadian producers will be
on a "level playing field."10
In projecting the impact of each sub-sector of North
Dakota energy, subsidies, both direct and indirect, will not
10Clayton Yuetter, U.S. Trade Representative, Office of
the United States Trade Representative, televison interview,
CTV's Question Period. 1 May 1988.

\
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be factored into the cost of production.

There will be no

examination of the subsequent effect subsidies have on the
export price, if subsidies do in fact exist, although this
has the potential to be very important to each countries'
ability to compete in the energy market.

Although

negotiations are to be held to deal with the subsidy
question, the results of the negotiations, if any, cannot be
speculated upon, and therefore cannot be taken into account.
Oil and Gas Industry
i
An examination of the current trading relationship
between North Dakota and Canada is made difficult by the
lack of trade statistics broken down by state and province;
statistics are available for regions only.

Therefore, there

is a need to make estimates as to how much oil and gas is
traded between North Dakota and Canada.
There was no crude oil entering North Dakota from
Canada to be refined in North Dakota in 1987 and Canada has
not been a historical petroleum supplier to North Dakota.
All of the oil and gas refined in North Dakota was extracted
from North Dakota.1
12
1

The Canadian oil situation mirrors the

North Dakota situation, in that Canada does not import North
Dakota oil.

The nature of American and Canadian oil

production is that production is comsumed inside the borders
of what is now the free trade area.

Because Canadian and

11Bob Graveline, Associate Director, North Dakota
Industrial Commission, Oil and Gas Division, interview by
author, 12 April 1988.
12Ibid.
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American oil production does not fully supply the needs of
its internal market, there appears to be little chance for
trade behavior to change as a result of the agreement.

Thus

it appears that the same assumptions made for the North
Dakota oil industry also hold for the Canadian oil industry.
There are some refined oil products coming into North Dakota
from Canada but these will not be considered as refined
products goes beyond the scope of this analysis.
North Dakota oil producers extracted 45,600,000 barrels
of crude oil and 62.2 billion cubic feet of natural gas in
1987.

In 1987, 27,000,000 barrels of the total production

were sent out of state and 18,600,000 barrels of oil were
refined and consumed in the state.

North Dakota natural gas

consumption was 19,234,050,000 cubic feet in 1987.

None of

North Dakota's excess natural gas extraction was exported to
Canada.

In extracting the above-mentioned amount of oil and

gas, the industry employed 5211 people at an average salary
of $27,192.83 per year.13

More recent figures were not yet

available for inclusion in this analysis.
The key to determining the effect of the FTA on the
North Dakota Oil and Gas industry is the price of these
commodities and how prices are determined.

Oil as a

commodity is traded on the commodities market in a manner
that is close to the free market in North Dakota's case.
Since 1984, the petroleum cartel, the Oil Producing and
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Wages Annual
1985 [Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of Labor, October
1987.
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Exporting Countries (OPEC), has been unable to agree on the
optimum number of barrels to supply to importers that would
benefit each producing nation while simultaneously keeping
the world price of oil as high as possible.

In the North

American market there is no difference in the way that the
Canadians market their oil, and there are no special
subsidies that exist to the producers of either country,
with the exception of exploration subsidies.
Oil prices have fluctuated greatly over the past ten
years, but neither the United States or Canada can have even
a minute effect on the world price.

The price will continue

to fluctuate as the OPEC producers agree or continue to
disagree on the amount of production.

North Dakota has

relied on foreign refined oil products and will continue to
benefit from foreign oil with the FTA.

The United States

will continue to benefit from the security of Canadian oil
supplies versus other foreign oil supplies with the
protection of the FTA.

It is hoped that the U.S. will

become secure in supply with Canadian reserves open to
American Companies and ultimately to American consumers.
The United States will also not be subject to the policy of
the Canadian government in the late 1970s-early 1980s of a
National Energy Policy which served to limit the percentage
of foreign oil companies that could operate in Canada.
A continued supply of incoming foreign oil will allow
North Dakota to sacrifice potential short term production
jobs for future energy security.

The current North Dakota-
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Canada trade in refined oil products is designed so that
North Dakota will depend on some foreign oil (in this case
in a refined state) to protect some of its oil reserves, in
order to retain energy security in the future.14

The

benefit to North Dakota in relying on some foreign oil is
not unifaceted, however.

It also allows for a more

efficient use of capital in the state vis-a-vis the refining
of crude petroleum.

The price of building additional

refining facilities outweighs the benefits in refining more
oil in the state.15

North Dakota production, whether

consciously or unconsciously, is following the economic
reasoning of the theory of increasing costs as discussed in
chapter two.

To determine the value of this plan for North

Dakota's energy security, crude oil reserves have to be
examined.
North Dakota currently has crude oil reserves of
approximately 262,000,000 barrels.16

At the current level

of production, assuming that there is no further crude oil
14This also allows North Dakota to forgo production
when the price of North Dakota crude is too low to warrant
extraction.
15Bob Graveline, Associate Director, North Dakota
Industrial Commission, Oil and Gas Division, interview by
author.
16U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, U.S. Crude Oil. Natural Gas, and Natural Gas
Liquid Reserves 1984 Annual [Washington, D.C.]: U.S.
Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 25
September 1985. An examination of the 1984 production year
yielded an increase in reserves of 2,000,000 barrels after
1984's production had been taken into account. The
relationship between newly discovered reserves and
production allows the reserve base to stay quite stable.
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potential in the state, North Dakota oil reserves would be
depleted in five and one-quarter years.17

Currently the

newly discovered reserves have kept pace with crude oil
extraction to keep reserves stable.

But there will come a

time in the future when North Dakota will have no further
reserves.

The state will then become totally dependent on

out of state supply.
Therefore, it is in the state's best interest to
partially rely on foreign oil, or as is the current
situation foreign refined petroleum products, for a portion
of its petroleum comsumption.

This would allow North

Dakota's crude oil industry to stablilize the extraction
industry, offering a more stable employment situation in the
industries future, and as a benefit to the state tax coffers
offer a stable tax supply as well.

The FTA would allow

North Dakota to deplete the resources of another state or
country and saving some of its reserves for the future.

The

North Dakota Council on Oil and Gas and the United States
Energy Information Administration was unable to supply an
estimate as to potential recoverable petroleum resources.
This makes it nearly impossible to determine optimum crude
oil extraction.

Thus such an attempt to calculate this

benefit has not been made in this paper.
Natural Gas.

The price of natural gas closely follows

crude petroleum production because the production of natural

17220,000,000 (reserves) divided by 45,600,000 (1987
production) = 5.74 years.
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gas is most often associated with the extraction of
petroleum.

During the last four years the natural gas

industry in both the United States and Canada has
experienced de-regulation, the result has been a more
competitive pricing system for natural gas in both
countries.

But the Canadian producers of natural gas have

little hope that the FTA will mean expanded markets for its
natural gas, and by implication, North Dakota consumers will
not likely receive any benefits from added competition.
The supply of marketable natural gas in Canada did,
however, increase from 65.1 billion cubic meters in 1983 to
71.9 bilion cubic meters in 1986.

During that time span,

the value of export natural gas fell from $195 per thousand
cubic meters to $122 per thousand cubic meters (Canadian
dollars).

But despite this drop in price North Dakota's

competition is limited.

Manitoba produces no natural gas

and therefore isn't a threat to North Dakota's markets.
Saskatchewan produced 1,814 million cubic meters, accounting
for 2.5 percent of Canada's production.

Although the price

of Canadian natural gas has fallen dramatically as a result
of the de-regulation of the Canadian natural gas industry,
it appears doubtful that the FTA will have any short-term
implications for the North Dakota natural gas industry.
To illustrate the lack of change in natural gas
marketing as a result of the FTA, we have to assess whether

1
ft
xoWet
Natural Gas is gas produced from an oil producing
well.
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the FTA will affect the marketing patterns of natural gas
producers from the pre-agreement status quo.

Joe Mercier,

President of Calgary's Universal Explorations Ltd., which
exports five million cubic feet per day of natural gas to
the United States has doubts that the FTA will at all affect
the marketing of natural gas in the United States or Canada:
I don't think that this (the Free Trade Agreement) is
going to make a damn bit of difference. The Americans
buy gas when they want it. If its a cold winter they
will buy, if its warm they will buy less. It's as
simple as that. It's a big game and free trade has no
effect. 9
North Dakota's gas reserves total 664 billion cubic
feet of dry marketable natural gas.

At the current rate of

production, the state's reserves will last for 10.67 years
•

•

if no more reserves are discovered.

o n

•

North Dakota will

eventually run out of natural gas, but, as is the case with
crude petroleum, the unexpected discovery of new reserves
makes the estimation of the depletion of North Dakota's gas
reserves difficult.
If North Dakota is willing to take advantage of the
FTA, as it pertains to the purchase of natural gas from
Canada, it stands to gain in the following ways:
1.

The FTA provides security to the users of gas.

Without the FTA, and its current energy provisions, the
state would deplete oil and gas reserves more quickly.

The1
0
2
9

19Financial Times of Canada (October 12, 1987).
20664,000,000 (reserves) divided by 45,600,000 (1987
production) = 10.67 years.
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result will be higher prices to the North Dakota consumer in
the long run.
2. Employment in the oil and gas industries will be
spread over a longer period of time than would be the case
if North Dakota had to supply all of the crude petroleum and
petroleum products its consumers currently demand.
3. Revenue from the oil extraction tax and the oil and
gas gross production tax will remain stable over the longrun for the state.
The costs of the FTA relative to North Dakota Oil and
Gas indsutries would be:
1. Reliance on foreign oil and gas which could put
North Dakota in a vulnerable position were the current
trading situation in which no tariffs are levied on crude
oil and gas production was to change.

The state might not

be in the position to immediately supply itself with the
necessary oil aand gas.

However, during the time frame of

the projections, there would be no threat of running out of
oil without the agreement.

The ease of resuming production

of oil and gas does lessen this drawback, however.

Refined

petroleum products is the real area of concern for short
term effects of the maintenance of the status quo because
Canada could certainly apply large tariffs to refined
petroleum products if the FTA were to break down.
2. When North Dakota oil and gas reserves are depleted,
assuming that no other technology exists for the uses
currently served by the oil and gas industry, the state's
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users will be subject to the foreign supplier's conditions
and the threat of increased costs if supply was held back.
This danger is lessened by the fact that Canada is and has
been a relatively stable supplier in the past, but OPEC has
certainly not been as predictable in its exporting behavior.
The precise costs and benefits in dollar terms cannot
be determined because of the limitations of the data.
Although there is little evidence that there will be a
change in oil and gas extraction behavior as a result of the
FTA,

North Dakota would be wise to pursue an optimum

extract-import situation.

Because of the lack of knowledge

of the actual reserves of both oil and gas, the optimum
extract-import situation is not calculated.
the topic of more extensive study.
relatively clear —

This could be

But the results remain

North Dakota should not gamble with its

non-renewable oil and gas resources.

Once these resources

are depleted, North Dakota will be bound by the rules of its
supplier, absent a trade arrangement such as the FTA; North
Dakota's tax base will also suffer a considerable loss.
Coal and Electricity Industries
The coal and electricity industries are to be jointly
examined due to the dependence of the North Dakota coal
industry on the intra-state generation of electricity.
Statistics on electricity traded between North Dakota and
Canada are more complete in comparison to oil and gas
statistics, and this lends itself to a more detailed
examination than the previous section.

Table 4.1 presents a
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breakdown of fuels used for the generation of electricity in
North Dakota for 1986.

Table 4.1

Electricity Generation in North Dakota
by Energy Source (1986)
Power Generated3

Energy Source

Coal Fired
Hydro Electric
Other*3
Totals

* ,

Percent of Total
Power Generated

19,835

89.4

2,326

10.5

21

0.1

22,182

100.0

agigawatt hours
^includes petroleum fired, gas fired, petrleum combustion,
and gas combustion.
Source: Bill Robinson, North Dakota Department of
Intergovernmental Assistance, 1988
The following assumptions are made in the analysis of
North Dakota's electricity and coal industries.

Consumption

of electricity in North Dakota will rise two percent per
year (the projected national average to the year 2000).
Manitoba and Saskatchewan's domestic electricity consumption
will also increase by two percent per year (estimates of
Manitoba Hydro and Saskatchewan Power Corporation).

Coal

consumption will remain constant to aid in the calculation
of the number of years that North Dakota coal reserves will
last.

It is assumed that Manitoba and Saskatchewan will

realize proposed additions to generating capacity as

114
reported in the 1986 Annual Report on Canadian
electricity.21
Of the 25.7 million short tons22 of coal extracted and
used in North Dakota during 1986, 17,354,000 of the total
coal consumed was utilized for the generation of
electricity.

No lignitic coal was imported from Canada.

North Dakota's electricity industry generated
22,182,000 megawatt hours during 1986.

During that same

period North Dakotas consumed 6,398,651 megawatt hours.

The

excess of the power, 15,781,349 megawatt hours were sold or
exchanged with out of state buyers.

Also included in the

excess electric power generated is the losses that occur in
the transmission of power to its customers, either in state
or out of state.
The FTA will provide Canada and the United States
continued access to each other's coal and electricity
markets as explained in the introduction of this chapter.
As such, intuitively it would seem reasonable that the
cheapest of the price of the imported electricity,
domestically available electricity, or the cost of a company
to generate its own electricity, should be the determining
factor in an electric power company's decision to buy or
generate the electricity bound for its market.

It would

also seem logical that one party would generate an
2iEnergy, Mines and Resources Canada, Electric Power in
Canada 1986 [Ottawa, Ont.]: Energy, Mines and Resources
Canada, 1987.
22The standard unit of measure for coal in the United
States is the short ton which equals 2000 pounds.
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additional amount of electricity to sell to another party if
there was money to be made with reasonble risks.
however, complicating factors to this.

There are,

These complicating

factors follow the examination of the current trading
relationship between North Dakota and Canada in electricity.
In 1986, North Dakota imported 1,381,010 megawatt hours
of electricity from Canada (value approximately $15,000,000
U.S.).

Manitoba is the larger of North Dakota's Canadian

suppliers having sold 1,271,127 megawatt hours to North
Dakota in 1986, accounting for ninety-two percent of
electricity imported into North Dakota.

During that same

period, Saskatchewan, North Dakota's only other foreign
electricity supplier, sold 109,883 megawatt hours for in
state consumption, or eight percent of North Dakota's
imported electricity.
In order to determine whether trade in electricity
between North Dakota and Canada will be affected by the FTA,
there is a need to examine whether Manitoba or Saskatchewan
will change their exporting behavior, i.e will the
generating capacities of Manitoba or Saskatchewan change as
a result of the FTA?
In 1986, Manitoba had an installed generating capacity
of 4142 megawatts (99.3 percent hydro generated and 0.3
percent coal fired).2
24
3

If all of Manitoba's generating

23Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, Electric Power in
Canada 1986.
24 Ibid.
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stations were to operate at full capacity for one hour, a
total of 4142 megawatt hours would be generated.

Because of

the fluctuations in water supply and load requirements, it
is estimated that Manitoba had the capacity to generate
23,000,000 megawatt hours in an average year.25

Presented

below is table 4.2 demonstrating the potential amounts of
surplus electricity that Manitoba will have available for
export if added generating capacity begins as planned in
1986.

This table does not reflect a possible revision with

the signing of the free trade agreement.

Table 4.3,

presented below, demonstrates Saskatchewan's planned
additions to generating capacity to the year 2000,
irregardless of the FTA.

As was the case with Manitoba

Hydro, the assumption is made that with an increase in
generating capacity, the same proportion of electricity will
be made available to service North Dakota demand for
electricity.

Saskatchewan's generating capacity in 1986 was

2659 megawatts.26

It is estimated by the Saskatchewan Power

Corporation that the province will generate 11,900,000
megawatt hours at that capacity.

To determine the yearly

electricity generation for the analysis period, additional
capacity is calculated at the same ratio of generating
capacity to yearly generation (1:0.0002234).

25Ron Kirby, Vice President for Development, Manitoba
Hydro, interview by author.
26Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, Electric Power in
Canada 1986.
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Table 4.2

Year

Manitoba Electricity Generating Capacity
and Projected Sales, 1986-1999.

Increase in
Generating
Capacity

Average Yearly
Generation
(mw.h)

Projected
Consumption
(mw.h)

Excess
Available
for Export

1986

0

23,000,000

13,900,000

9,100,000

1987

0

23,000,000

14,178,000

8,822,000

1988

0

23,000,000

14,461,560

8,538,440

1989

0 -

23,000,000

14,750,791

8,249,209

1990

256

24,419,767

15,045,807

9,373,960

1991

640

27,973,348

15,346,723

12,626,625

1992

348

30,105,497

15,653,658

14,451,839

1993

0

30,105,497

15,966,731

14,138,766

1994

0

30,105,497

16,286,065

13,919,432

1995

0

30,105,497

16,611,787

13,493,710

1996

0

30,105,497

16,944,022

13,161,475

1997

130

30,827,318

17,282,903

13,544,415

1998

520

33,714,603

17,628,561

16,086,042

1999

650

37,323,709

17,981,131

19,342,578

Source: Electric Power Statistics 1986 (Ottawa: Energy,
Mines, and Resources Canada, 1987).
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Table 4.3

Saskatchewan's Electricity Generating Capacity
and Projected Sales, 1986-1999.
Projected
Consumption
(mw. h)

Excess
Available
For Export

11,900,000

10,100,000

1,800,000

0

11,900,000

10,302,000

1,598,000

1988

100

12,347,537

10,508,040

1,839,497

1989

100

12,795,073

10,718,201

2,076,872

1990

0

12,795,073

10,932,565

1,862,508

1991

280

14,048,176

11,151,216

2,896,960

1992

0

14,048,176

11,374,240

2,673,936

1993

0

14,048,176

11,601,725

2,336,451

1994

85

14,428,582

11,833,760

2,594,822

1995

280

15,681,685

12,070,453

3,611,250

1996

0

15,681,685

12,311,844

3,369,841

1997

0

15,681,685

12,558,081

3,123,604

1998

0

15.681,685

12,809,242

2,872,443

1999

0

15,681,685

13,065,427

2,616,258

Year

Increase in
Generating
Capacity

Average Yearly
Generation
(mw.h)

1986

0

1987

Source : Electric Power Statistics 1986 (Ottawa: Energy,
Mines and Resources Canada, 1987)

As table 4.2 indicates, Manitoba would stand to gain a
greater share of the North Dakota electricity market if its
generating capacity increases by the amounts indicated, on
average 23.8 percent over the twelve year period compared
with a 19.9 percent share held in 1986.

This observation is

made with the assumption that Manitoba Hydro could supply
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over and above its commitments to its domestic consumers.
Saskatchewan as a supplier of electricity is not and will
not be a major force in generating power for export to the
North Dakota market.

Table 4.3 demonstrates Saskatchewan's

ability to supply excess power to potential out-of-province
customers.
When one combines Manitoba's and Saskatchewan's excess
electricity, and assumes that each province will continue to
provide North Dakota with electricity equal in proportion of
electricity sold to North Dakota compared with that
province's excess for sale, it appears that Canadian
electricity will gain a greater share of the North Dakota
electricity market.

The average share that Canadian

electricity producers would hold over the twelve year period
to the year 2000 would be 25.925 percent.27

The following

tables (4.4 and 4.5) illustrate the share of the North
Dakota electricity market if Manitoba and Saskatchewan were
to sell the same proportion of electricity to North Dakota
as a proportion of its total generating capacity based on
the 1986 generating year.

P7

•
For Saskatchewan the average market share •is derived
from the average projected share of North Dakota's
electricity market from table 4.5. For Manitoba the average
market share is derived from the average of projected share
of North Dakota electricity market for the period in table
4.4.
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Table 4.4

North Dakota Projected Electricity Consumption
and Projected Manitoba Share of the Import
Electricity Market
Sales To
North Dakota13

Projected Share
of ND Market

Year

North Dakota
Consumption3

1986

6,398,651

1,271,127

13.4

1987

6,142,827

1,226,258

20.0

1988

6,565,019

1,186,843

18.1

1989

6,735,709

1,146,640

17.0

1990

6,910,837

1,302,980

18.9

1991

7,090,519

1,755,100

24.8

1992

7,274,873

2,008,805

27.6

1993

7,464,019

1,965,288

26.3

1994

7,658,084

1,934,801

25.3

1995

7,857,159

1,875,625

23.9

1996

8,062,482

1,829,445

22.7

1997

8,271,080

1,882,673

22.8

1998

8,486,128

2,235,959

26.3

1999

8,706,767

2,688,618

30.9

aThis assumes a 2% increase in North Dakota electricity
consumption each year from 1987 to 1999.
bBased on the proportion of excess generating capacity of
the province in relation to the amount exported in the 1986
generating year.
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North Dakota Projected Electricity Consumption
and Projected Saskatchewan Share of the Import
Electricity Market.
Sales to
North Dakota*3

Projected Share
of ND Market

Year

North Dakota
Comsumptiona

1986

6,398,651

109,800

1.7

1987

6,142,827

97,478

1.5

1988

6,565,019

112,209

1.7

1989

6,735,709

126,689

1.9

1990

6,910,857

113,613

1.6

1991

7,090,519

176,714

2.5

1992

7,274,873

163,110

2.2

1993

7,464,019

149,233

2.0

1994

7,658,084

158,284

2.1

1995

7,857,159

220,286

2.8

1996

8,061,482

205,560

2.5

1997

8,271,080

190,540

2.3

1998

8,486,128

175,219

2.1

1999

8,706,767

159,592

H
•*
00

Table 4.5

aThis assumes a 2% increase in North Dakota electricity
consumption each year from 1987 to 1999.
i_

DBased on the proportion of excess generating capacity of
the province in relation to the amount exported in the 1986
generating year.

The increase that Canadian electricity producers could
realize in the share of the North Dakota market without
increasing generating capacity beyond what is already
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planned, is presented as a worst case scenario.

If

individual power companies want to buy power from Canada,
they may do so now.

North Dakota shouldn't expect an

increase over the amount per year that is currently being
sold, though.

Most of the electricity sales to North Dakota

is in the form of interruptable electricity, purchased when
an electric company may be short of power for its customers
during a peak period, or after the breakdown of its own
generating plant or its supplier's plant.
Even with the FTA, Manitoba's decision to increase its
generating capacity will not be altered.

The projected

increases in generating capacity are made with the intention
of ensuring that Manitoba's domestic market's needs are
adequately taken care of.

Any excess is available for sale.

Mr. Ron Kirby, Vice President for development for Manitoba
Hydro said that the FTA will not in any way affect Manitoba
Hydro's decision to increase its generating capacity above
and beyond its current plans with the chance of obtaining a
greater market share in North Dakota, or in any state for
that matter.28
Increasing generating capacity to serve a potential
market that could disappear in six months (the notice one
party must give to the other for the termination of the
agreement), would simply be too risky.

Manitoba Hydro's

reaction to increase its generating capacity to fulfill this

no

,

,

,

Ron Kirby, Vice President for Development, Manitoba
Hydro, interview by author.
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potential market would involve billions of dollars in
investment of new hydro-electric generating stations.
Manitoba is not prepared to take such a risk.

To further

illustrate this point we may look to Manitoba's planned
addition to its generating capacity in 1997-1999.
Construction of the Katanakus hydro electric generating
station (at a cost of $5 billion Canadian) is contingent on
guaranteed long-term power sales to the province of Ontario.
The sale is currently being negotiated with Ontario for the
(
sale of 1000 megawatts of noninterruptable power. This sale
to Ontario further weakens Manitoba's ability to supply
excess power to North Dakota and thus Manitoba's ability to
supply North Dakota's import market would be diminished.
According to the President of Manitoba Hydro, A. Brian
Ransom, construction of the generating station will not be
undertaken unless Ontario signs an agreement guaranteeing
the purchase of power.

O Q

Compounding the unwillingness of Manitoba Hydro to take
such a risk is the fact that many of North Dakota's power
companies are bound by the costs associated with previous
generating decisions, and in the short run, would not choose
to buy power for resale to its customers unless that power
is purchased to supplement a peak demand.

For example, a

company that has chosen to build its own generating station,
which many companies have chosen to do, is bound to9
*
9Q

,

.

A . Bryan Ransom, President of Manitoba Hydro.
Interview on the Canadian Broadcasting Association's news
program 24 Hours. 15 November 1989.
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contracts for energy input, whatever the fuel of choice may
be.

Capital investment in generating plants must also be

taken into consideration as a factor distorting the decision
to generate or buy electricity from another supplier.
Replacing generating plants that are neither outdated, or in
many cases, have bonds that are still outstanding, would be
placing a great amount of capital in a position to lie idle.
Thus the sunk costs argument of Markusen comes into
effect.30

Abandoning plants in these situations becomes

extremely inefficient, economically speaking.
A related topic must be considered: the efficiency of
purchasing electricity.

Ninety-eight percent of Manitoba's

electricity exports to North Dakota and 89.4 percent of
Saskatchewan's electricity exports to North Dakota is
interruptable, that is, power is not continuously supplied.
Acquiring interruptable power supply enables North Dakota's
power companies to handle peak load seasons much more costeffectively.

A North Dakota power company will not be

forced into building generating capacity exceeding its
average demand load when that generating capacity would be
grossly under-utilized during the remainder of the year.
Obtaining interruptable electricity from Canada thus lowers
North Dakota's power companies' capital costs associated
with running plants far below capacity.

This certainly must

30For a further discussion of sunk costs see chapter
two; see also James R. Markusen "Canadian Gains from Trade
in the Presence of Scale Economies and Imperfect
Competition," in John Whalley, Canada-U.S. Free Trade
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).
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be viewed as a benefit associated with the maintenance of
free trade in energy.

Although the exact saving to the

consumer is difficult to calculate for the state as a whole,
it has been estimated that North States Power Company (NSP)
customers have saved $42.5 million per year ($24
million/year in fuel cost savings and the remaining saving
in plant construction deferral) as a result of having access
.
. .
.
.
to Canadian
electricity
imports
for this
very reason.31

A

second benefit of such a situation is that capital will not
be crowded out of the market place.

Thus capital should be

more readily available and the costs of capital should be
cheaper, economically speaking.
Saskatchewan Power Corporation started the period with
1.7 percent of the North Dakota domestic power market.

In

1999, Saskatchewan Power Corporation could potentially
supply 1.8 percent of North Dakota's market.

The average

share of the North Dakota electricity market that
Saskatchewan may have across the twelve year period between
now and the year 2000 is 2.05 percent, which is slightly
more than what is currently held by the Saskatchewan Power
Corporation.
There is little question that the FTA on its face
appears to present a favorable situation to Canadian power
producers, presenting them with the continued opportunity to3
1

31Anthony Benkusky, Vice President for Transmission and
Inter-Utility Services. Testimony to the Congressional
Subcommittee on Trade, Ways and Means Committee, March 11,
1988, Fargo North Dakota.
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sell excess electricity.

But the risk involved, e.g. sunk

costs and unpredictable tariff behavior, will prevent the
Canadian power producer from flooding the market with
cheaper energy.

Rules contained in the FTA pertaining to

the dumping of energy (and other products) below the costs
of production will provide further protection to North
Dakota producers.
It is expected that the present trading relationship in
lignitic coal will continue.

Saskatchewan exported only

$9,333 (Canadian dollars) worth of coal to the region
consisting of Minnesota, North Dakota and South Dakota in
1986.

Whichever state(s) received this lignite certainly

didn't receive a quantity to be considered substantial.

It

is expected that this lack of trading between North Dakota
and Canada in lignitic coal will continue.

Even with the

government procurement section of the FTA, there is no
restriction for the government of North Dakota or private
business to continue its practice preferential purchasing of
coal.

This section applies to the federal governments of

the respective countries only (on purchases over $100,000).
It is likely then that the trade in coal will not be
affected by an agreement that maintains the pre-agreement
status quo.
Efficient Generate-Purchase Decisionmaking.

North

Dakota has an energy supplier in this state that does
operate with the assumption that efficiency is best achieved
with a combination of ninety percent of its energy generated
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from within the company and ten percent of the energy
purchased from the outside suppliers.

In deriving this

ninety-ten breakdown, Northern States Power Company (NSP)
has taken into account the risks involved with purchasing
power and has taken steps to guarantee supply from, in this
case, foreign suppliers.
Northern States Power is also able to react to problems
in supply for electricity generating fuels by diversifying
its choice of fuels. In 1988 fifty percent of the
(
electricity generated by NSP came from coal, thirty-five
percent came from nuclear power, ten percent came from
Canadian hydro electric power, and five percent from
domestic hydro electric power.

This diversification of

supply and the relatively small reliance on imported power
has not only brought about a stable supply of energy to its
customers, but has also saved the NSP customer twenty-four
million dollars per year in just lower fuel costs.32
In addition to the fuel savings provided by NSP
purchasing a portion of its electricity, savings have
accrued to NSP's customers in the deferral of plant
construction and the saving of major capital expenditures.
Energy purchases from Canada displace higher cost
generation.

This has saved NSP customers $250 million in

the period between 1980 and 1987.33

Anthony Bunkusky, Vice

President for Transmission of NSP, identified how the
32Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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savings are utilized: some of the savings are passed on
directly to the customer in the form or lower energy costs;
the remainder allows NSP to explore and develop new coalfired technologies.

These new technologies will enable NSP

to build high-tech coal-fired plants that cost considerably
less than current practices and are environmentally
friendlier.34

Northern States Power Company has

successfully blended a diverse set of generation resources
into an efficient production system.
Northern States Power Company has explicity stated it
is not looking to forego domestic power sources; NSP uses
8.5% of all coal shipped in the west-north-central region or
one percent of all coal shipped in the U.S.

The benefits

that accrue to NSP and its customers have resulted from a
diverse mix of resources, providing production cost
stability, supply reliability, and the encouragement of
competition among alternative energy sources needed to
produce lower costs.
If North Dakota doesn't have access to Canadian
electricity, more coal will be required to handle the void
created.

North Dakota's coal reserves will be depleted in

365 years, which is certainly a long time, especially with
prospects for new energy technology in the years to come.35
If the current market share that Canadian electricity
34Ibid.
359 ,790,965,000
(coal reserve) divided by 26,787,810
(coal to generate electricity) = 365 years (assuming
constant consumption).
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producers currently enjoy, North Dakota coal will deplete in
380.97 years.36

If Canadian electricity producers were to

gain a 25.925 percent share of the North Dakota electricity
domestic market, North Dakota’s coal reserves would deplete
in 384 years.37

This doesn't amount to a great monetary

benefit given the time period in which the benefit would be
received but nonetheless it must be considered.
For North Dakota's electricity consumers, there would
be numerous benefits and few costs associated with the
provisions of the FTA (maintaining the free trade status
quo).

First there would remain a somewhat competitive

market for electricity in North Dakota which would keep
prices down.

Canadian producers would also subsidize North

Dakota's consumers if the Canadian producers are indeed
subsidized.
Second, if Manitoba is to remain the dominant foreign
producer of electricity to North Dakota, a reduction in the
amount of pollution in the state will result.

Manitoba's

energy is chiefly water generated, which does not contribute
to the air pollution caused by coal-fired plants.

A

reduction in the amount of pollution should then result, by
the amount that Manitoba Hydro supplies in addition to its
present market share.
369.790.965.000 (coal reserve) divided by 25,700,000
(coal to generate electricity) = 380.97 years (assuming
constant consumption).
379.790.965.000 (coal reserve) divided by 25,479,104
(coal to generate electricity) = 384 years (assuming
constant consumption).
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Third, in the event of supply shortages in Manitoba or
Saskatchewan, either supplier would be mandated to share
supply.

Thus North Dakota consumers would be guaranteed the

same proportion of power generated before the shortage, thus
the North Dakota consumer assumes less risk in importing
Canadian electricity as the Canadian producer takes in
exporting this power (given capital costs of generating
stations.
Fourth, North Dakota would benefit from maintaining a
diversity of supply of fuels used to generate electricity.
Thus current reserves of coal would last longer, causing
more steady employment for the residents of the regions
which rely so heavily on energy for local economic activity.
The costs of the FTA relative to the coal and
electricity generating industries are fairly minor.

This is

the case because of the pre-FTA situation not the FTA
itself.

The rules of the game are not set to change

dramatically with the FTA.

Thus the state will be able to

operate with the same amount of energy security as it did
before the agreement was entered into.
maintaining the status quo, however.

There is a cost in
This is the potential

security cost of allowing foreign energy to permeate into
the North Dakota market.

This cost is, however, offset by

the cost-effectiveness of importing energy to supplement a
lower generating capacity and the benefits associated with
this strategy.
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The bottom line in limiting the effects of the
agreement in the willingness of Canadian producers to supply
electricity to North Dakota consumers is the risk involved.
Adding to generation capacity would be very risky to
Canadian suppliers given that the FTA can be terminated with
six months notice of one of the parties, leaving the
electricity industry with underutilized capital and bonded
indebtedness.

This would ultimately lead to the price of

electricity rising for consumers to carry the burden of the
debt.

The FTA thus provides no security to foreign

producers that each other's markets will continue to be made
available (beyond the six month period of notice to
terminate the agreement).

This translates into a very

cautious and conservative increase in imported power to
North Dakota, if any.

But such an increase would have

occurred regardless of the FTA.
The FTA would allow the present exchange of electricity
between North Dakota and its Canadian suppliers to continue,
providing no unforeseen hardships to North Dakota's
consumers of electric power.

In the event of electricity

shortages in either country, the buyers are protected by the
reduction in supply rule, which prohibits the supplier from
reducing the proportion that the customer would have
received if there hadn't been a reduction.

Most of the

trade in electricity is undertaken by a written contract
which would address such a scenario for reduction in supply.
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The diversity of supply that exists in the North Dakota
domestic electricity market is beneficial to the state.
Although coal resources would last for more than 370 years,
this is a finite amount.

The citizens of the state are

essentially determining the fate of future generations by
using up non-renewable resources at a rate much faster than
may be necessary.

The FTA allows North Dakota to continue

to slow that depletion, as well as having access to cheaper
electricity which is subsidized by another country.

In

creating diverse sources of electricity supply, North Dakota
consumers would recieve cheaper average rates, and would not
forego the electricity supply within the state.

This

diversity is important in maintaining a stable source of
electricity for North Dakota consumers.
North Dakota consumers thus receive the best of both
worlds from the FTA relative to electricity.

Excess

Canadian electricity, which is cheaper in price than North
Dakota's internally generated electricity, will be made
available if North Dakota wants to buy it.

The six month

notice requirement for termination does ensure that North
Dakota's market will be inundated with Canadian energy.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The development of North Dakota's economy has been
characterized by much the same factors as David Ricardo
described: most notably, production decisions based on a
region's comparative advantage.

In an analysis of the

development of the North Dakota economy based on Watkin's
staple hypothesis, Stradley discusses the state's economic
development, yet he never directly addresses North Dakota's
economic development based on comparative advantage.

But

as a result of the dominance of, and the reliance on, its
two staple sectors, the North Dakota economy has taken on a
unique character in the North American production area.

The

state has been willing to concentrate its production on its
staples and trade for other goods it does not choose to
produce (for many reasons).
But North Dakota has not only historically relied on
its staple industries as the backbone for its private
economic activity, the state has also built its public
economic system around its staple economy.

As the state's

1Scot A. Stradley, A Staple Perspective on Economic
Development in North Dakota (University of North Dakota:
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, May 1981).
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private economy is characterized by the boom and bust cycles
of a resource-based economy, the public economy shares the
same distinction.

In examining the basis for its taxation

system, it is quite apparent that the rationale for the
North Dakota system parallels the mercantilist's philosophy;
i.e., gain in the short term by reaping huge profits (tax
revenues) without regard for the long term consequences of
such a taxation philosophy (huge shortfalls during resource
bust cycles).

The underlying flaws in North Dakota's tax

system would be even further accentuated if the United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) causes the North
Dakota economy to experience decline.

Thus this independent

study has examined the impacts of the FTA on North Dakota's
energy industry, not only because of energy's great impacts
on the producing regions, but also because of an underlying
reason, the stability of the institutions of government in
the state.
Using the quantitative economic literature as an aid to
predict the impacts of the FTA on North Dakota's energy
sectors has not been very helpful.

Very few studies even

mentioned energy, and where energy was mentioned, processed
energy was addressed which is not within the scope of this
study.

Even where energy is specifically mentioned there is

no indication as to the areas that will be impacted and
which states will be the winners or losers in this process.
This has made the task of determining the impacts of the FTA
on North Dakota energy that much more difficult.
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Most of the quantitative literature has dealt with the
general welfare gains to each economy by utilizing
relatively simple economic models, without regard for the
realities of the complexity of the American and Canadian
economies.

Wannacot and Wannacot, along with other

economists identified benefits for manufacturing and other
industries based on scale economy considerations using these
models.

9

.

.

.

•

But without seriously considering the non economic

effects of a free trade area, namely consumer preference,
elasticity of demand, or even the politics of consumption,
the analyses are weakened in the ability of regional policy
analysts to utilize the results to generalize impacts of the
FTA on the North Dakota economy.
When one looks back to chapter four of this study, one
theme becomes clear: the FTA itself will not substantively
change the way energy is traded between North Dakota and
Canada.

Absent the FTA, trade in energy would likely

continue in much the same manner that occurred before the
FTA.

North Dakota will not lose in the general sense, as it

should continue at current production rates.

A major

benefit accruing to North Dakota is the continuance of a
degree of supply diversity which is cost-effective for state
consumers of energy.

The long run benefit to the North

Dakota consumer will be lower prices because diversity of
supply will create a longer-term, and more stable producer
2
^Ronald Wannacot and Paul Wannacot, Free Trade Between
the United States and Canada: The Potential Economic Effects
(Cambridge, Massachusets: Harvard University Press, 1967).
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in North Dakota.

If fact, the energy producing industries

in North Dakota will produce longer under the FTA (the same
guarantee of no tariffs on the trade in energy which was the
trading situation immediately preceding the agreement) than
if North Dakota were to rely exclusively on its own energy
resources.

The FTA thus serves to guarantee the status quo.

Continuation of the FTA serves only to perpetuate the preFTA trading situation by six months, relative to pre
agreement foreign producer market guarantees.

Thus the

risks involved in future investment tend to nullify the
rational economic benefits of a free trade area.
The FTA provides no real security to Canadian energy
suppliers to invest in capital intensive production to
supply a free market economy that cannot be guaranteed
beyond the six month termination period.

As was separately

argued by Markusen and Trembley, the risks to capital
intensive producers (in North Dakota's and its competitor's
case, energy production) in changing production behavior to
serve potential international markets appears to be too
high.

The FTA may be dissolved with only six months notice

from either party.

As such, Canadian energy suppliers are

3See James R. Markusen, "Canadian
.
. From .Trade in
Gains
the Presence of Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition,"
in Canada-United States Free Trade, ed. John Whalley
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); or Rodrique
Trembley, "Adjustment Concerns during the Transition to
North American Free Trade," in Assessing the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement, eds. Murray Smith and Frank Stone
(Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987).
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not likely to be willing to make large, long run investments
only to have the FTA dissolved.
Adding to the sunk cost considerations that weaken the
impact of the FTA, the political instability surrounding the
agreement in both countries makes the agreement's future
inherently unstable.

Two of the three major political

parties in Canada vehemently oppose the agreement.

If one

of these parties forms a government in Canada the agreement
will almost certainly be dissolved.

In the United States,

if the mood of the Congress becomes protectionist, e.g. the
costs of the agreement are too high given the perceived
benefits, the agreement could be dissolved.

The historical

instability of trade liberalization attempts between the
United States and Canada support this contention.

This

instability does affect the actions of the energy industries
on both sides of the border.
North Dakota energy producers weren't expected to gain
new markets as a result of the agreement.

The purpose of

including energy in the agreement was to guarantee American
access to Canadian energy supplies.4

Williams' analysis of

the industries expected to make gains from the FTA points to
those that have enjoyed the protection of tariffs.5

With

the exception of government procurement policies and some
4External Affairs Canada, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement [Ottawa, Ont.]: External Affairs Canada, January
1988.
5
See chapter three and James R. Williams, Resources,
Tariffs and Trade: Ontario's Stake. (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1978)
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energy regulation, North Dakota and Canada have enjoyed
fairly open access to each other's energy.

The obvious

benefits of the FTA would accrue to: states with industry
requiring large and stable amounts of energy; states that
are dependent outside of their boundaries for energy
resources; and states that are rapidly depleting its
resources.
categories.

North Dakota doesn't fall into any of the above
But as mentioned earlier, the less obvious

benefits of maintaining the status quo is beneficial for
North Dakota energy producers and consumers.
But a benefit of the agreement that may not so obvious
is that the FTA does make the North Dakota electricity
producer aware of its Canadian competition.

The North

Dakota producer of electricity may have new markets
available to it because of the electricity generating
situation in Manitoba, although this is not directly the
result of the FTA.

Manitoba's electricity generation

resource, water, experiences fluctuation cycles, at times
leaving Manitoba unable to generate sufficient electricity
to meet its domestic commitments.

Power sharing agreements

between Northern States Power Company and Manitoba have in
the past compensated for these shortages of electricity.
North Dakota should agressively seek those types of
agreements for the sharing of its excess power.

The

negotiations set to develop electricity in a mutually
beneficial manner may in fact lean toward this type of an
arrangement.
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A major determinant of the impact and stability of the
agreement is the effect that the agreement will have on the
multilateral world trading system, and more specifically, on
the members of the GATT.

If the agreement can have a

significant impact on the way goods are traded among the
members of the GATT, and can ease the tensions of the most
recent trade conflict among the members of the GATT6, then
perhaps the agreement will last a long time.

It can be

reasonably assumed that if the conflict can be resolved
among the GATT's membership, the United States and Canada
will then benefit from free trade because Canada, and more
especially, the United States, has been shut out of many
potential export markets because of the high tariff and non
tariff barriers of the other GATT members.

There is a

strong indication that North Dakota will realize a benefit
from this situation in agricultural production, but in
energy there would appear to be no additional benefits as
such.

North Dakota's oil industry, for instance, has

experienced its greatest growth when foreign suppliers of
oil are unstable.7

The OPEC oil embargos of the 1970s

attest to that fact.
Confidence is the key to the agreement changing the
attitudes and behaviors of the parties involved.

Gaining

confidence in the capital intensive industries is difficult,

ft

For instance the U.S.-EEC agricultural subsidy war.

7Scot A. Stradley, A Staple Perspective on Economic
Development in North Dakota.
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however.

If confidence cannot be achieved in capital

intensive industries, the agreement will have little effect
on North Dakota's energy.

Agriculture, North Dakota's other

economic staple, finds itself is a different situation,
however.

Agriculture has the potential to shift production

quickly among many commodities.

The Canadians will have

access to the U.S. market, but the reciprocal will not be
the case until the U.S. drops a great deal of the
subsidization that exists for its grain producers. It is
<
therefore important to pursue further study of the FTA's
effects in the area of agriculture.
What appears clear in the implementation of the FTA is
that the potential effects on the American and Canadian
economies may not be seen for some time.

As mentioned in

chapter three, the tariff reduction schedules will not be
fully completed until 1998.

If one looks at the EEC as a

model for the harmonization of the economies of a free trade
area, it appears that the U.S. and Canada will have to wait
a long time for the benefits and costs of the FTA on sectors
of the North American economy to take hold.

The EEC,

established in 1958 on a limited scale, has yet to see a
total harmonization of its members' economies.

The EEC is

set to undertake a more comprehensive harmonization of its
economy slated for 1992.

Until the harmonization of the

American and Canadian economies occurs, the FTA may seem
quite neutral.
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As the FTA will not change the energy trading
relationship between North Dakota and Canada, by implication
North Dakota's reliance on its energy industries for a
significant portion of general fund revenue and transfer
payments to local governments will unfortunately remain tied
to the world price of crude oil.

The stabilization of

energy supply that goes along with the free trade in energy
produces a more stable tax base, at least to the extent of
OPEC's ability to maintain price stability.

Thus the

challenge of stabilizing the revenue base in North Dakota
still needs to be addressed, which has been a factor
underlying the analysis from the beginning.

But the FTA

itself does present opportunities in sectors other than
energy that must be explored.

Because there is a potential

for enhanced economic development and economic diversity as
a result of the FTA, the state should explore the potential
of the agreement not only to diversify the state's economy,
but also to diversify North Dakota's tax base as well.
The FTA also presents a favorable situation that may
not appear so obvious to North Dakota's political leaders as
well.

The agreement provides policymakers with a reminder

of the economic situation in the North Dakota: the
performance and the nature of the market for staple industry
products in North Dakota has been abysmal lately.

There

have been repeated calls to diversify the North Dakota
economy; the agreement at least gives us an opportunity to
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re-examine the economic makeup of North Dakota and to
discover ways to make it more stable.
The writer has addressed the many difficulties in
assessing the impacts of the FTA.

As such, admittedly, much

more study is needed to be able to put an actual cost or
benefit the FTA will have on North Dakota's economy.
Although all the costs and the benefits aren't quantified,
on the whole there seems to be a net benefit as a result of
the FTA's maintaining the status quo in energy trade. As
<
such, North Dakota should be content with the agreement.
The state should now turn its attention to finding ways to
use the agreement to effect an optimum balance of importing
energy for domestic use and producing and extracting for
domestic use and interstate sale.
A New Direction: Recommendations
It should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with
the economy of North Dakota that the state in the 1980s has
been and remains in serious fiscal trouble.

As a result,

people are leaving the state, per capita income increases
have not kept pace in the past few years with inflation,
state services have suffered under shrinking budgets in real
dollars, to name a few symptoms of the problem.

The FTA

should be looked at as a means of expanding the North Dakota
economy and getting away from its historical dependence on
its staple existance.

North Dakota has longed for the

diversification of its economy for many years.

The Fifty-

First Legislative Assembly (1989) experienced much debate on
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the role of the North Dakota Economic Development Commission
and its task of seeking to attract the kind of business that
will bring much needed diversification to the North Dakota
economy and much needed tax base stability.8

What this

debate has failed to even consider is the impact and the
opportunities that the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement may bring about.

Thus the continued woes of the

state's economic crises have left intact the characteristic
of the most recent legislative assemblies, their shorti

sightedness.
North Dakota should follow the lead of another American
city, Buffalo, New York, in seeking to secure its own
economic well-being.

Buffalo is currently making an effort

to take advantage of the agreement by attempting to entice
business from the Canadian side of the border to move to the
stronger business climate the American side of the border
has to offer.

New York can offer this more attractive

environment even though it has the third highest tax burden
of any state in the United States.9

But the attractiveness

of Buffalo lies in its low tax rates and the quality of its
economic enhancement programs relative to Ontario, and
especially Quebec.
O
For a discussion of North Dakota's economic climate
see Maurice A. Bouvier and Cynthia Feland Economic
Development in North Dakota and South Dakota: A Comparison
of Business Climates. Economic Development Programs, and
Other Economic Development Variables (Bismarck, N.D.: North
Dakota Legislative Council, 7 March 1989).
9Grant Thornton Manufacturing Climates Study (New York:
Prentice Hall, July 1988).
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North Dakota can offer Canadian light manufacturing
firms a more attractive business climate than can New York
or most other states for that matter.

According to a study

of manufacturing climates undertaken by the Grant Thornton
Company in 1988, North Dakota ranks second in manufacturing
attractiveness in the United States, second to only South
Dakota.10

New York rates only forty-third relative to all

other states.

Of course the costs of transportation from

North Dakota to major markets within the United States and
Canada has to be considered.

Nonetheless, North Dakota's

attractiveness to business must be marketed wherever
possible.
Although North Dakota has been relatively unsuccessful
in attracting business from within the borders of the United
States, much of the unattractiveness of North Dakota has
been its weather and lack of an integrated transportation
system.11

However, North Dakota's strength lies in its low

wage rates, the low rate of unionization, and its low worker
compensation costs.

North Dakota must take steps forward to

lure Canadian manufacturing to North Dakota, stressing
business climates, and offering incentives to perspective
business.

As mentioned earlier in this paper, the six month

cancelation clause will limit the kind of business that
North Dakota will be able to attract.

North Dakota's

greatest possibility for attracting business, and
in

.

Grant Thornton Manufacturing Climates Study. 1988.

i:LGrant Thornton Manufacturing Climates Study. 1988.
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diversifying its economy, thus lies in the area of light
manufacturing.
In attempting to lure Canadian business, North Dakota
should choose to re-examine the quality and attractiveness
of its business incentives.

Presently North Dakota ranks

near the bottom (46th) of the Grant Thornton Manufacturing
Climates Study in state business incentives. * This index
comprises dollars dedicated to grant, equity, and early
stage debt programs; number of participants served under the
Job Training Partnership Act per unemployed person in the
state; five-year change in the unemployment rate; new
business formation as a percentage of all businesses;
taxability of machinery used/consumed in production;
inventory tax exemptions; and sales tax rates.

Table 5.1,

which follows, compares this index with selected states in
the United States (National average is 1.00).
An example of the kind of manufacturing that could be
attracted to North Dakota is bus manufacturing.

Pembina,

North Dakota and Winnipeg, Manitoba are currently working on
different manufacturing processes on the same buses.

The

FTA calls for a tariff reduction schedule of "C" on buses
going into Canada (Canadian tariff of 9.2%) and schedule "D"
on buses going into the United States (no U.S. tariff on
Canadian buses going into the American market).
less risky, and more profitable,

It may be

for North Dakota to try to

obtain the whole manufacturing process toward the end of the
12Grant Thornton Manufacturing Climates Study. 1988.

146
phase-in period of the FTA.

But the opportunities that the

FTA brings to North Dakota lie not only in light
manufacturing.

Table 5.1

Ranking of State Business
Incentives: Selected States.

State

National Rank

Factor Valuea

North Dakota

46

0.613

California

42

0.823

1

1.418

Minnesota

34

0.912

New York

11

1.158

South Dakota

31

0.940

Delaware

aThis figure is derived from a number of variables related
to the attractiveness of business incentives, as explained
in the paragraph preceding this table. The higher the
factor, the more attractive the state's incentives (national
average is 1.00).
Source: Grant Thornton Manufacturing Climates Study (New
York: Prentice Hall, July 1988).

Although transportation itself is not included in the
provision of the FTA, the opportunity to store and allow for
the distribution of products is not prohibited.

North

Dakota's location in the North American continent leaves it
in a good position to become a distribution center for
Canadian goods coming into the United States and American
goods going into Canada.

North Dakota's interstate highway

system directly links it to the major market in Winnipeg (a
major Canadian distribution center), and indirectly links it
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to the other western Canadian cities (via the TransCanada
Highway).

Fargo also sits in an ideal position to serve the

major mid-western market of Minneapolis, Kansas City, and
beyond.
The above examples illustrate the need for North Dakota
to become imaginative in exploring the opportunities
afforded by the FTA.

North Dakota doesn't however have the

luxury of attracting all different types of industries
covered in the.agreement.

But what it may do over and above

the area of light manufacturing is seek development in the
area of agricultural products processing.

The state's

economy would be less dependent on agricultural production
yet receive the benefits of adding value to its production.
The lack of value-added economic activity in North Dakota
leaves the state subject to the boom and bust cycles it is
all too familiar with.
Although the FTA is not certain to be around for a long
time, North Dakota must search for its opportunities.

The

North Dakota Economic Development Commission (EDC) is not
presently doing a great job in planning for the impacts of
the FTA.

North Dakota cannot create diversity in its

economy until the EDC acts to explore the opportunities
other than in the staple industries, i.e., by enticing other
viable economic activity.

The United States-Canada Free

Trade Agreement has the potential to help North Dakota
expand its economy in its staple industries as well as other
areas.

If the United States and Canada are successful in
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leading the world into the twenty-first century in free
trade, North Dakota's agriculture industry will boom, and
perhaps its economy will not be held hostage to the boom and
bust cycles that have characterized its economy in the
twentieth century.

North Dakota residents and the North

Dakota treasury certainly needs and hopes for this type of
stability.
Unfortunately, the agreement does not guarantee OPEC
oil production stability.

The ability to influence the

;

4

world trading system rests on the pressure exerted by the
two parties to this agreement on the world trading system.
If this agreement is successful in exerting pressure,
perhaps trade will stabilize the North Dakota economy in a
manner it has not been able to achieve in the past.
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APPENDIX A
NORTH DAKOTA GROSS STATE PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY, 1949-1986.
(Millions of $)
FARMING
AGRIC. SERVICES
MINING
CONSTRUCTION
MANUFACTURING
Non-Durable
Durable
TRANS/COMM/P.U.
Transportations
Communications
Public Utilities '
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE
Finance-Insurance
Real Estate
SERVICES
GOVERNMENT
TOTAL GSP
(Millions of $)
FARMING
AGRIC. SERVICES
MINING
CONSTRUCTION
MANUFACTURING
Non-Durable
Durable
TRANS/COMM/P.U.
Transportations
Communications
Public Utilities
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE
Finance-Insurance
Real Estate
SERVICES
GOVERNMENT
TOTAL GSP

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

348.5
2.0
9.5
39.8
31.7

451.6
2.2
9.9
43.8
32.4

457.9
2.2
12.1
46.3
36.9

369.8
2.3
23.9
49.7
38.6

370.9
3.3
31.3
48.4
38.0

85.2

90.8

99.3

105.6

111.0

186.9

193.8

210.4

214.1

207.5

51.0

58.0

62.1

68.1

79.0

51.2
79.9

55.6
80.9

59.1
89.8

63.3
98.1

72.0
101.3

885.7

1019.0

1076.0

1033.3

1062.7

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

349.6
3.2
32.2
65.7
40.8

433.4
3.5
33.5
50.0
43.8

424.9
3.4
35.1
58.5
42.6

379.0
3.4
34.2
67.2
46.8

109.8

115.4

121.6

125.0

214.0

229.6

237.8

249.6

86.2

88.9

95.7

106.7

74.6
105.0

74.2
107.8

78.2
114.6

82.9
121.6

485.2
4.8
40.3
67.5
49.9
37.6
12.4
124.4
70.2
23.9
30.3
256.3
97.7
158.6
116.0
30.4
85.7
89.1
133.1

1081.1

1180.1

1212.3

1216.5

1366.9
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NORTH DAKOTA GROSS STATE PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY, 1949-1986.
(Millions of $)
FARMING
AGRIC. SERVICES
MINING
CONSTRUCTION
MANUFACTURING
Non-Durable
Durable
TRANS/COMM/P.U.
Transportations
Communications
Public Utilities
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE
Finance-Insurance
Real Estate
SERVICES
GOVERNMENT
TOTAL GSP
(Millions of $)
FARMING
AGRIC. SERVICES
MINING
CONSTRUCTION
MANUFACTURING
Non-Durable
Durable
TRANS/COMM/P.U.
Transportations
Communications
Public Utilities
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE
Finance-Insurance
Real Estate
SERVICES
GOVERNMENT
TOTAL GSP

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

317.3
4.7
39.8
77.8
54.7
40.4
14.3
133.3
71.2
27.7
34.5
275.5
106.3
169.1
129.5
34.5
94.9
99.1
151.1

404.8
3.7
31.4
72.7
52.2
38.2
14.1
139.0
69.9
30.0
39.1
276.1
106.1
170.0
139.9
38.9
101.0
105.3
173.3

266.1
3.8
35.4
73.2
51.5
38.8
12.7
143.7
69.5
32.2
42.1
277.7
109.4
168.3
146.5
37.2
109.3
112.3
193.4

631.2
4.0
33.3
91.5
53.6
39.9
13.7
151.3
71.5
34.3
45.5
300.8
127.7
173.1
157.8
38.6
119.2
117.4
212.1

460.0
3.9
31.8
90.8
67.4
40.8
26.6
159.7
72 .5
37.7
49.5
310.3
123.8
186.5
168.3
39.9
128.5
123.0
238.2

1282.9

1398.9

1303.6

1752.8

1653.4

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

369.8
4.3
33.7
115.5
69.9
45.8
24.1
166.5
72.7
39.4
54.4
329.3
130.2
199.2
169.2
42.4
126.7
130.1
257.3

524.0
4.7
36.6
114.0
78.3
46.8
31.5
178.7
79.9
41.7
57.0
347.2
139.2
208.0
184.0
46.6
137.5
140.7
282.5

483.2
5.3
38.3
92.6
89.6
51.1
38.4
187.3
82.8
45.4
59.0
363.5
145.9
217.5
192.2
52.0
140.2
156.2
313.3

467.8
5.7
39.6
90.8
85.3
51.7
33.6
192.1
81.0
49.1
62.0
380.3
149.0
231.4
199.2
55.4
143.9
165.7
321.8

454.0
5.8
40.8
90.3
93.1
56.6
36.5
202.1
83.4
53.5
65.3
407.1
158.3
248.8
196.5
59.4
137.1
180.2
345.0

1645.6

1890.8

1921.5

1948.3

2014.9
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NORTH DAKOTA GROSS STATE PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY, 1949-1986.
1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

582.0
10.7
42.7
109.5
99.2
63.4
35.8
228.4
95.2
56.0
77.2
452.8
178.2
274.6
220.0
68.2
151.8
226.2
374.2

492.1
11.5
42.7
144.6
112.7
70.6
42.1
240.0
102.2
59.4
78.4
475.0
185.3
289.7
240.4
73.8
166.6
241.0
423.3

684.1
14.3
43.1
165.2
125.7
77.9
47.8
267.5
112.7
64.3
90.5
517.0
202.7
314.3
267.2
81.2
186.0
261.9
461.4

890.9
14.6
41.7
200.9
135.9
78.8
57.1
298.2
126.9
71.1
100.2
589.9
246.1
343.8
295.5
89.6
205.9
287.3
507.1

2097.7
18.0
48.1
197.5
165.1
89.0
76.1
325.2
140.3
78.7
106.2
724.9
329.2
395.7
326.2
95.5
230.7
338.1
546.3

2345.7

2423.3

2807.4

3262.0

4780.1

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

FARMING
AGRIC. SERVICES
MINING
CONSTRUCTION
MANUFACTURING
Non-Durable
Durable
TRANS/COMM/P.U.
Transportations
Communications
Public Utilities
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE
Finance-Insurance
Real Estate
SERVICES
GOVERNMENT

1758.4
23.4
77.1
232.9
199.7
99.2
100.5
353.3
158.7

1657.8
26.2
97.8
293.5
274.6

924.7
28.8
149.7
406.7
303.9
149.8
154.1
527.2
215.2

1349.6

106.0
846.7
413.9
432.8
363.9
105.5
258.4
372.1
579.5

153.4
391.0
157.6
99.9
133.5
950.0
478.7
471.3
423.3
121.7
301.6
422.6
638.5

1182.8
24.7
123.9
364.0
300.1
132.1
168.0
460.6
187.9
114.4
158.3
1045.0
502.3
542.7
502.1
143.3
358.8
499.6
707.8

189.1
1126.5
532.8
593.7
588.2
180.0
408.2
574.2
755.8

TOTAL GSP

4807.0

5175.3

5210.6

5385.7

(Millions of $)
FARMING
AGRIC. SERVICES
MINING
CONSTRUCTION
MANUFACTURING
Non-Durable
Durable
TRANS/COMM/P.U.
Transportations
Communications
Public Utilities •
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE
Finance-Insurance
Real Estate
SERVICES
GOVERNMENT
TOTAL GSP
(Millions of $)

88.6

121.2

122.9

33.4
221.7
509.0
334.6
165.1
169.5
604.4
256.8
140.1
207.5
1210.0
573.1
636.9
689.5

211.6
477.9
668.0
819.3

6439.5
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NORTH DAKOTA GROSS STATE PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY, 1949-1986.
(Millions of $)

1979

1980

1981

1982

198 3

FARMING
AGRIC. SERVICES
MINING
CONSTRUCTION
MANUFACTURING
Non-Durable
Durable
TRANS/COMM/P.U.
Transportations
Communications
Public Utilities ■
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE
Finance-Insurance
Real Estate
SERVICES
GOVERNMENT

1614.2
35.8
353.4
540.0
371.1
177.8
193.3
675.4
301.2
148.0
226.2
1375.6
671.2
704.4
722.7
231.1
491.6
750.1
890.1

1053.2
32.9
623.3
523.7
373.6
188.2
185.4
766.4
340.4
170.5
255.5
1419.6
707.1
712.5
769.7
254.3
514.4
856.5
966.3

1685.0
35.3
1074.8
501.1
410.4
221.0
189.4
840.9
369.4
184.0
287.5
1547.7
787.7
760.0
828.2
270.6
557.6
988.6
1101.2

1739.1
40.1
869.1
565.2
428.3
253.1
175.2
980.3
360.5
196.3
423.5
1604.5
797.9
806.6
839.2
272.0
567.2
1062.2
1194.7

1338 .6
49. 5
653 .4
660. 8
460. 1
280. 6
179. 5
1128 .2
363 .4
212 .7
552 .1
1613 .0
768 .5
844 .5
923 .6
308 .0
615. 6
1155. 6
1274 .4

TOTAL GSP

7328.4

7385.2

9013.2

9322.7

9253 .6

(Millions of $)
FARMING
AGRIC. SERVICES
MINING
CONSTRUCTION
MANUFACTURING
Non-Durable
Durable
TRANS/COMM/P.U .
Transportations
Communications
Public Utilities
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE
Finance-Insurance
Real Estate
SERVICES
GOVERNMENT
TOTAL GSP

1984

1985

1986

1829.0
44.3
689.7
524.4
506.2
300.6
205.6
1294.4
397.4
214.5
682.5
1736.8
842.0
894.8
963.0
304.7
658.3
1245.6
1352.7

1751.4
36.3
632.3
447.1
520.7
311.4
209.3
1317.2
385.7
225.3
706.2
1754.3
827.7
926.6
971.1
322.8
648.3
1314.8
1448.5

1395.6
38.9
399.9
436.0
530.7
525.8
204.9
1298.8
378.4
227.8
692.6
1749.1
819.4
929.7
1020.5
347.4
673.1
1375.4
1503.6

10186.1

10193.7

9748.5

Note: Sub-sector detail not available prior to 1958
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Sources:

Richard Kauffman and Bulent Uyar "North Dakota
Gross State Product, 1949, 1983 (University of
North Dakota: Bureau of Business and Economic
Research, December 1985).
and
Bulent Uyar "North Dakota Gross State Product:
1969-1986. (University of North Dakota: Bureau of
Business and Economic Research, forthcoming).
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APPENDIX B
PROVISIONS OF THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
NOT APPLICABLE TO ENERGY

This appendix summarizes the provisions of the U. S .Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that do not apply to the
energy sector, but are included to provided a complete
presentation of the FTA's provisions.

This presentation is

also provided to augment the recommendation section of
(
chapter five.
Agriculture

This section eliminates all bilateral

tariffs and export subsidies, and limits or eliminates
guantitative restrictions on some agricultural products,
including meat.

Quotas on poultry and poultry products on

U.S. exports going into the Canadian market are allowed.
American sugar subsidies and nontariff protection are also
retained under the agreement.

Canadian import licenses and

some other nontariff barriers for wheat, oats, and barley
are eliminated when U.S. crop price supports are equal or
less than those in Canada.
The above provisions of the agreement provide for a
more open North American market for agricultural products.
But implicit in freer trade in agricultural commodities is
the potential effect of trade liberalization on GATT
nations, and more especially, the European Economic
Community (EEC).

The agreement appears to be an explicit

attemp to force the hand of the EEC members to eliminate
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production and export subsidies so that agricultural
production will be based on efficiency and not on subsidies.
If the U.S. and Canada are able to change world subsidy
behavior as a result of their own bilateral trade
liberalization, both countries should gain as their
production is more efficient than any other country.
Wine and Distilled Spirits

Currently Canadian wine

and distilled spirits are protected in Canada from America's
similar products.

The FTA seeks to eliminate all barriers

to the trade in these commodities over a seven year period
from 1989 through 1995.

Most discriminatory practices

against wine and spirits imported from the other country are
removed, with the exception of Ontario and British Columbian
private wine outlets, which are allowed to favor their own
wine if the outlet was established before October 5, 1987.
Beer and other malt products are exempted from this
agreement; current discriminatory practices afforded
Canadian beer producers will remain intact.
Autos

Trade in automobiles is presently free,

governed by a bilateral agreement separate from the FTA: the
Auto Pact.

The FTA builds on the provisions of the Auto

Pact to ensure that the trading of automobiles and
automobile parts are not subject to discriminatory actions
of one or both of the parties to the FTA.
The big three (GM, Ford and Crysler) as well as other
automakers will benefit from the agreement.

Automobiles and

parts from all over the world will be allowed into the free
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trade zone provided that these goods meet the Auto Pact
production safeguards; safeguards that promote the
continuance of a strong automobile manufacturing presence in
North America in the midst of strict foreign competition.
The rules of origin, discussed in chapter three will govern
the import of automobiles and automobile parts.
In addition to protecting the automobile manufacturing
in the free trade zone, one of the major goals of the FTA
and the Auto Pact is the expansion of the North American
*
!

automobile market into countries that currently export
automobiles into the free trade zone.

A select panel for

the purpose of advising the North American automobile
industry will be set up for this purpose.
Exceptions for Trade in Goods

The FTA provides for

import and export controls on certain goods for the
following reasons:
1. to protect public morals (prohibition of pornographic
materials);
2. necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health (measures to protect the environment or endangered
species);
3. trade in gold or silver;
4. necessary to ensure compliance with domestic laws and
regulations not otherwise inconsistent with the GATT (such
as product standards);
5. Relating to the products of prisoner labor;
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6. necessary to protect national treasures of artistic,
historic, or archaelogical value; and
7. undertaken in pursuance of an international commodity
agreement (such as the international wheat or tin
agreement).
The exemptions for the above reasons are consistent with the
GATT, Article XX.

Without such exemptions, there would be

very little chance of establishing such a wide-sweeping
trade agreement.1 •
Services

(
Within the last two decades much of the

grwoth in the American and Canadian economies' has been in
the area of services.

During this period of growth of the

service industries in the United States and Canada, the GATT
negotiations have failed to provide adequate protection
against discriminatory trade practices in services.

"It is

no longer possible to talk about free trade in goods without
talking about free trade in services because trade in
services is increasingly mingled with the production, sale,
distribution and service of goods."2

The FTA proposes to

break new ground in this area, providing a framework for
member nations to update the GATT.
Services covered by the FTA include the production,
distribution, sale, marketing, and delivery of services, as
well as the establishment of a commercial presence to
1External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (Ottawa: External Affairs Canada, 1987).
2External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: 194.
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,
O
distribute, market and deliver services.

.
Most commercial

services are covered in the FTA with the exception of:
1. Transportation;
2. Basic communications (e.g. telephone service);
3. Medical Doctors;
4. Dentists;
5. Lawyers;
6. Child care;
7. Government services (e.g education, social
i

services).
It is expected that more services will be added to be
covered in the agreement in the coming years.

Negotiations

will be periodically untaken to accomplish this expansion,
however the time frame is unspecified.4
Each government may choose to regulate covered
industries as long as both countries' services are treated
equally.

Regulation (including licensing and certification)

may not be a disguise for trade discrimination.

If

regulation is challenged by one of the parties as being
discriminatory, the burden of proof lies with the party
establishing the regulation.5

Regulations already in effect

do not have to change; only new regulations imposed by the
•"External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: Section 1401.2.
4External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S . Free Trade
Agreement: Section 1405.
5External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: Section 1403.2.
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parties have to comply with the provisions of this
agreement.
Financial Services

Each of the parties will be

guaranteed access to each of the other party's market for a
full range of financial services.6

Until 1987, Canadians

had greater access to the American banking market than was
true of the reciprocal.

The FTA guarantees American access

to the banking market of Canada.

American bankers will no

longer be subject to foreign investment ceilings in the
i

Canadian financial market.
Applications of American banking to conduct business in
Canada will continue to be subject to refusal based on the
stability of the institution, and the applicants ability to
contribute to Canadian financial markets.7

Disputes

invloving financial services, with the exception of
insurance, are not covered by the dispute procedures of this
agreement.

The Department of the Treasury of the U.S. and

the Department of Finance of Canada will consult in disputes
of these manners.

^External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: Section 1702.
7External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: Section 1703.

